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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the governance framework 
of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses the speciﬁ  c 
option of increasing the role of benchmarking as 
a means of improving the implementation record 
of structural reforms in the European Union. 
Against this background, the paper puts forward 
a possible avenue for developing a strong form of 
quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. The 
ranking methodology relies on the construction 
of a synthetic indicator using the “beneﬁ  t  of 
the doubt” approach, which acknowledges 
differences in emphasis among Member States 
with regard to structural reform priorities. The 
methodology is applied by using the structural 
indicators that have been commonly agreed 
by the governments of the Member States, but 
could also be used for ranking exercises on the 
basis of other indicators.
JEL codes: D02, P11, P16, C43, C61
Key words: Lisbon Strategy, economic 
governance, benchmarking, beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
weighting5
ECB




There is a broad consensus that structural 
reforms are essential in order for the euro area, 
and the European Union more generally, to face 
up to the triple challenge of globalisation, rapid 
technological change and an ageing population. 
The most concrete policy manifestation of this 
consensus has been the adoption of the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2000. This paper discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings and development 
of the governance framework of the Lisbon 
Strategy and puts forward a methodology 
for strengthening this framework through 
quantitative benchmarking. Speciﬁ  cally, 
the paper reviews the literature on the 
political economy of structural reform in a 
single-country context and complements it 
with the insights of the literature on supply-
side coordination among the Member States of 
the EU and the euro area. The paper then looks 
at the practical development of the framework 
that governs supply-side coordination in the 
EU, that is, the governance framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy. In the context of the structural 
reform implementation gap that emerged in 
the ﬁ  rst half of the 2000s, the analysis focuses 
on the 2005 mid-term review of the Strategy. 
During the preparatory phase of this mid-term 
review, two main governance reforms were put 
forward. One was aimed at strengthening the 
commitment of Member States to implement 
reforms by increasing the ownership of the 
reform agenda by national governments and 
stakeholders. The other was the suggestion to 
benchmark Member States’ performance in 
order to monitor effectively progress made with 
reforms. In the end, while an increase in national 
ownership was partly achieved, the mid-term 
review shied away from the development 
and application of a rigorous method for 
benchmarking Member States’ performance.
Against this background, the paper puts 
forward a possible avenue for developing the 
benchmarking element of the Lisbon governance 
framework. It develops a strong form of 
quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. 
The ranking methodology provided relies on 
the construction of a synthetic indicator using a 
“beneﬁ  t of the doubt” approach. The approach 
has the advantage of acknowledging differences 
in the emphasis that the EU Member States put 
on structural reform priorities. With regard to 
empirical results, as with other benchmarking 
methods, the outcome of applying the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt methodology depends also on 
the choice of indicators. The methodology 
is therefore applied by using the structural 
indicators that have been commonly agreed by 
the governments of the EU Member States, and 
therefore enjoy legitimacy in a policy-making 
context. Nevertheless, the methodology could 
also be used for benchmarking exercises on the 
basis of other indicators.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a broad consensus among European 
policy-makers and academics that structural 
reforms are key to increase growth potential 
and face up to the challenges posed to the 
European Union (EU) by globalisation, rapid 
technological change and an ageing population. 
One of the most concrete manifestations 
of this consensus was the adoption in 
March 2000 by the Lisbon European Council 
of the wide-ranging programme of reforms 
that has come to be known as the Lisbon 
Strategy. Nevertheless, despite their solemn 
commitments made in Lisbon, the EU Member 
States have often been accused of backtracking 
on the implementation of the necessary 
structural reforms. This implementation gap 
raises questions about the political economy of 
structural reform in the EU in general, and the 
governance framework that is responsible for 
implementing the Lisbon Strategy in particular.
This paper analyses the governance framework 
of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses possible 
options for improving the implementation 
record of structural reforms in the EU. The focus 
of the analysis is on the use of benchmarking 
as a means of improving the monitoring and 
implementation record of structural reforms. 
Against this background, the paper offers a 
methodology for using the structural indicators 
that have been commonly agreed by the 
governments of the EU Member States in order 
to rank their economic performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses the difﬁ   culties arising from the 
political economy of structural reform in 
general (Section 2.1). It then looks more 
closely at the challenges of pursuing structural 
reform in the context of a process of economic 
integration (Section 2.2). Both economic theory 
and empirical evidence speak in favour of 
striking an appropriate balance between fully 
coordinated policy-making at the EU level, 
on the one hand, and completely decentralised 
action at the Member State level, on the other. 
Nevertheless, the clearly inadequate level of 
implementation of structural reforms in Europe 
has led some observers to suggest that this 
balance may not yet be fully optimal in the 
framework of economic policy coordination in 
the EU. One of the options put forward is a greater 
recourse to benchmarking (Section 2.3), a policy 
tool which has produced valuable results also 
in other policy areas (Section 2.4). Following 
an overview of the use of benchmarking in 
the Lisbon Strategy at present (Section 2.5), 
Section 2.6 concludes with a discussion of 
a strong form of quantitative benchmarking, 
namely ranking.
Against this background, the paper puts 
forward in Section 3 a methodology for ranking 
EU Member States’ performance based on a 
beneﬁ   t of the doubt approach (Section 3.1). 
Following a discussion of data availability 
and quality issues (Section 3.2), it explains 
the methodology for developing a composite 
indicator  for comparing the performance of 
Member States (Section 3.3), using the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt approach (Section 3.4). The 
paper then constructs the composite indicators 
for each Member State on the basis of the 
economic structural indicators agreed by the 
EU Council of Ministers, taking into account 
both the starting level and the progress made 
over time (Section 3.5). The sensitivity analysis 
and robustness checks are provided thereafter 
(Section 3.6). Section 4 summarises the main 
results and provides guidance on the use of the 
proposed ranking methodology and suggests 
further avenues for research.
[…] the process of setting up the euro area according to the Maastricht Treaty, which 
was signed and ratiﬁ  ed by our democracies, was based on a concept of benchmarking.
   J.-C. Trichet, ECB President, April 2007  1
Q&A session of the ECB press conference on 12 April 2007. 1 7
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2  THE LISBON STRATEGY AND ITS 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
The EU Heads of State or Government set up 
the Lisbon Strategy in March 2000 with the 
extremely ambitious aim of turning the European 
Union into “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion” 
(Lisbon European Council conclusions, 
March 2000). In order to achieve this broad 
goal, the Strategy was endowed originally with 
two policy pillars: an economic pillar focused on 
reforms to promote productivity, innovation and 
competitiveness, and a social pillar with reforms 
aimed at modernising the European social 
model, boosting employment and combating 
social exclusion. The Göteborg European 
Council of 2001 added an environmental 
pillar to the Strategy, which tackled aspects of 
sustainable development. Subsequent European 
Council meetings added further objectives to the 
Strategy. In a number of cases, these objectives 
were accompanied by quantitative targets 
(e.g. raising the overall EU employment rate 
to 70% and R&D spending to 3% of GDP by 
2010). The Lisbon Strategy subsequently 
became the shared blueprint of structural reform 
in the EU. It foresees a large list of policy 
objectives and actions that are to be pursued at 
European and national level. 
With regard to governance structures, in 
order to implement the Lisbon Strategy the 
European Council of March 2000 called for the 
most efﬁ  cient use to be made of the existing 
EU governance framework (mainly the Treaty-
based Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and 
Employment Guidelines), as developed in the 
period since the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992. The Lisbon Strategy was 
thereby embedded in the basic economic 
policy coordination mechanisms of the EU. 
Nevertheless, two institutional innovations were 
also introduced in 2000. First, the Heads of State 
or Government decided to hold an annual spring 
meeting to review progress and provide political 
impetus and direction to the Lisbon Strategy. 
Second, they introduced the open method of 
coordination (see Box 1) as a means of helping 
Member States to progressively develop and 
improve their policies in areas not covered by 
the existing governance processes.
Both the objectives of the Strategy as well as the 
governance framework for implementing these 
objectives have been developed and adjusted 
over the years. In particular, a consensus emerged 
in the early 2000s that EU Member States were 
failing to deliver the structural reforms envisaged 
by the Strategy. As the Spring European 
Council of 2005 put it, the results of the Lisbon 
Strategy were mixed ﬁ  ve years after its launch, 
“with shortcomings and obvious delays”. The 
overarching goal of making the EU the most 
competitive and dynamic economy in the world 
was also seen as over-ambitious and was not 
repeated in the European Council conclusions, 
especially given that the deadline for achieving 
the Lisbon goals had been set for 2010.
Against this background, the Lisbon Strategy 
underwent a mid-term review in 2005 (see Box 2) 
that refocused its goals and streamlined its 
governance framework, and continued to 
promise signiﬁ  cant  beneﬁ   ts for the EU. For 
example, Gelauff and Lejour (2006) estimated 
in 2006 that the Strategy could increase EU GDP 
by 12% to 23% and employment by about 11%, 
if ﬁ  ve of the most important Lisbon goals were 
met by 2010. However, achieving these results 
has remained uncertain, as many countries do 
not meet some or all of these goals. The Spring 
2007 European Council emphasised the progress 
made after the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy, 
“although the performance varies by Member 
State and policy areas covered”. Others were 
more critical. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2006) 
have argued that “in spite of some noticeable 
progress, the new Lisbon process is far from 
what would be needed to effectively support the 
goals of the Lisbon agenda”.
The details of the governance issues that are 
behind this mixed picture of hope and pessimism 
about the ability of the Lisbon Strategy to deliver 
the necessary structural reforms are at the core 8
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of this paper. Before turning to them, however, 
it is necessary to put the Lisbon Strategy in the 
broader context of the political economy of 
structural reform.
2.1  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM: 
EXPLAINING THE INERTIA 
Cross-country studies show that the 
implementation of structural reform varies 
widely between countries, as well as between 
sectors within countries, reﬂ  ecting  national 
preferences as well as political circumstances 
(Høj et al., 2006). The growing consensus in 
recent years about the desirability of structural 
reforms, not only in the EU but also in a number 
of other regions of the world, has not been 
matched by an equally strong implementation 
record in all countries and/or sectors 
(OECD, 2007). As mentioned above, the Lisbon 
Strategy has also been hampered by an uneven 
implementation of the necessary reforms. 
An understanding of the causes behind the 
resistance to structural reforms is therefore 
important in dealing with this “implementation 
gap”. Given the complexity of the issue, a single 
well-established model of the political economy 
of structural reform is not available (Høj et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, various explanations for 
the resistance to (structural) reforms have been 
identiﬁ  ed in the literature (see Rodrik (1996), 
Drazen (2000), IMF (2004) and Heinemann 
(2004) for an overview).
A  ﬁ   rst set of explanations is concerned with 
rational individual behaviour that can explain 
why societies fail to introduce reforms, even 
when the reforms will have a net welfare 
beneﬁ  t for the society as a whole. Fernandez 
and Rodrik (1991) have shown that a rational 
electorate could reject a reform that is known 
to beneﬁ   t a majority of voters, if there is 
uncertainty about the identity of the winners and 
losers of the reform. This leads to “status quo 
bias” as some reforms that would be beneﬁ  cial 
are not implemented for lack of popular support. 
Other explanations for the delay of reforms with 
short-term costs and long-term gains are the 
short time horizons of politicians and/or voters. 
Politicians who fear that the electorate will 
experience only the cost of reform during their 
term in ofﬁ  ce will be hesitant to implement the 
reform. Similarly, voters who prefer beneﬁ  ts 
today over larger beneﬁ  ts in the future (in other 
words, with a short time horizon and a high 
discount rate) are likely to oppose reforms, 
something which could be especially relevant in 
the context of ageing populations.
A second set of explanations of the resistance to 
reform focuses on collective action problems, 
interest groups and/or imperfect information. 
Some regulations create rents for a relatively 
small group of beneﬁ  ciaries, which constitutes a 
(well-organised) constituency resistant to reform, 
while the costs are spread over a much larger and 
less well-organised electorate (Olson, 1965).2 
Related to this explanation is the notion of 
“rational ignorance” (Downs, 1957), which 
postulates that individual information optimisation 
can lead to socially inefﬁ  cient outcomes. In other 
words, as the information costs are prohibitively 
high for the individual voter, the electorate as a 
whole will be badly informed about the gains and 
costs of reform. Asymmetric information can also 
lead to non-adoption of reforms when 
(better-informed) policy-makers cannot convince 
the electorate of the beneﬁ  ts of a proposed policy. 
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) showed that 
policy change that is optimal may not be adopted 
when the electorate cannot be certain if the 
proposed policy is motivated by concern for 
social welfare or by the partisan preferences of 
the policy-maker.
A third set of explanations is based on 
assumptions of limited rationality, leading to 
elementary economic misconceptions among 
voters. Heinemann (2004) argues that since 
voters who make irrational choices face no 
market punishment on an individual basis, 
This “logic of collective action” is also often used to explain  2 
why it may be difﬁ  cult to introduce welfare-enhancing trade 
liberalisation measures. In the case of trade, a relatively small 
but well-organised group may beneﬁ   t from particular trade 
barriers and thus lobby ﬁ  ercely for them, while the costs of these 
barriers are spread out widely.9
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human instincts and psychologically rooted 
irrationalities should have a deeper impact 
on economic policies than in private markets. 
Contrary to private economic decisions such as 
choosing an education with little employment 
opportunities, choosing a political programme 
that is doomed to economic failure is individually 
(almost) costless. Several empirically proven 
psychological circumstances could explain 
resistance to reform, such as the “endowment 
effect”, which is a smaller willingness to pay 
for acquiring a certain good than accepting 
compensation for giving up the same good. 
These explanations for the resistance to 
(structural) reforms are not mutually exclusive, 
and can be considered as complementary 
or even mutually reinforcing. For example, 
voters’ behaviour based on limited rationality 
considerations will raise the information hurdle 
that reformers need to overcome, and thereby 
strengthen the position of interest groups 
opposing reforms. 
2.2  THE EU GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK OF 
STRUCTURAL REFORM
The aforementioned explanations regarding 
the difﬁ   culties in pursuing structural reforms 
indicate the multiplicity of problems faced by 
policy-makers within the political and economic 
context of individual countries. In the case of 
the EU Member States, however, the political 
economy of structural reform has acquired 
an additional dimension as structural reforms 
are formulated and implemented in a context 
of deepening integration. In the resulting 
“multilevel governance” framework, certain 
policy responsibilities have been transferred 
to the European level (e.g. market regulation, 
competition policy). Moreover, certain 
economic policies which remain in the hands 
of the Member States (e.g. ﬁ  scal policies) have 
been made subject to more or less constraining 
forms of coordination and surveillance at the 
EU level. As a result, EU Member States no 
longer have complete and independent control 
of some of the economic policy tools that were 
at their disposal prior to the start of the European 
integration process. 
At the same time, the more limited economic 
policy leeway at national level should strengthen 
the incentives to undertake structural reforms, 
especially in the case of those Member States 
that participate in Monetary Union, as the lack of 
reforms weakens the resilience to, and increases 
the adversity of, (asymmetric) shocks. From a 
governance point of view, the supranational level 
can also act as a useful lever for implementing 
reforms at the national level, as governments 
have to act on the basis of commitments made 
at the EU level. Concerning economic policies 
in particular, based on the commitment to 
treat them “as a matter of common concern” 
(EC Treaty, Article 99), the EU Member States 
have developed EU-wide mechanisms for the 
monitoring and implementation of structural 
reforms given their shared interests in the 
performance of the Single Market and, where 
relevant, the single currency. In addition, Article 
128 of the Treaty provides for the coordination 
of the employment policies of the Member 
States. At the core of these processes lies the 
general notion that EU Member States share 
certain common goods and therefore need to 
coordinate their policies. Nevertheless, the extent 
of coordination of the Member States’ economic 
policies in particular has been a matter of debate 
both in policy as well as academic circles.
2.2.1 SOFT VERSUS HARD COORDINATION: 
THE THEORY
Two main economic arguments are generally 
used to explain the need in general for 
coordinated policy action at the European level 
(Tabellini and Wyplosz, 2004; Begg, 2003; 
Begg et al., 2003; Collignon, 2003): (i) the 
existence of externalities (i.e. the fact that one 
country’s actions affects other countries); (ii) 
the necessity to prevent or reduce the likelihood 
of free-rider behaviour by Member States, 
which may impose considerable costs on their 
partners.3 In cases where externalities are 
sizeable and the potential costs of uncoordinated 
behaviour are high, common policy action helps 
to internalise the externalities and minimise 10
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the costs of uncoordinated policies, thereby 
increasing overall efﬁ  ciency. 
However, the gains that can be expected from 
policy coordination have to be weighed against 
the associated costs. In particular, the feasibility 
of coordination hinges on the ability to: 
(i) agree on a common understanding between 
all actors of how different policy instruments 
impact on economic variables; (ii) process 
the information supplied by the participants; 
and (iii) provide adequate incentives to ensure 
that individual policy-makers live up to their 
commitments. 
The extent to which these conditions can be 
fulﬁ  lled, as well as the choice of instruments 
used to implement them, largely determine the 
degree (or “hardness” or “softness”) of 
coordination. Also within the EU, this range 
between “hard” and “soft” methods of 
coordination is manifested not only in terms of 
the legal status of the coordination procedures,4 
but also in such terms as the extent of information 
sharing; the frequency, number and depth of 
policy goal setting; and the possibility of 
sanctions and/or pecuniary incentives.
The gains of policy coordination as well as the 
associated costs vary according to the policy 
domain at hand. In the case of structural reforms 
pertaining speciﬁ   cally to national labour and 
product markets, Tabellini and Wyplosz (2004) 
have argued that the externalities arising from 
these supply-side policies tend to be pecuniary 
and are normally dealt with by the market. 
For example, if a member country manages 
to improve its productivity performance and 
therefore boosts its own economic growth, then 
its neighbours will likely beneﬁ  t from increased 
demand and relative price cuts, but this effect 
will essentially result from the move to a new 
price equilibrium and will not reduce incentives 
to improve productivity. Hence, decentralisation 
or, at most, “soft” coordination will be most 
beneﬁ   cial in the case of these supply-side 
policies, involving incentives for Member 
States to engage in healthy policy competition 
and experimentation. 
By contrast, others (e.g. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 
2006) have suggested that the complementarities 
between product market reforms (the 
responsibility for which resides partly at the 
EU level) and labour market reforms (which 
pertain to the remit of Member States) 
may nonetheless provide a justiﬁ  cation  for 
coordination at the EU level. The spillover effect 
occurs in this case not across countries, but 
across sectors. In addition, given the increased 
economic interdependence brought about by 
the internal market, the beneﬁ   ts of structural 
reforms will also accrue more quickly if all 
the EU Member States act in concert: a rising 
economic tide would lift every European boat. 
The need for structural reforms is even more 
pronounced for euro area members, while in 
certain cases this need also calls for a more 
enhanced coordination of supply-side policies. 
First, as the interest rate and exchange rate 
policy tools are – by deﬁ   nition – no longer 
available as policy instruments at national 
level, economic adjustment, especially to 
shocks, can only come from changes in the 
real economy. Accordingly, Monetary Union 
places an even bigger premium on structural 
reforms, as they are even more necessary in 
order to improve competitiveness, as well as 
the ﬂ  exibility of national economies to respond 
to shocks. Second, a reduction of structural 
rigidities in euro area economies can support 
the conduct of the single monetary policy, 
since greater ﬂ   exibility helps to lower price 
pressures at a given level of growth, which, in 
turn, may lead to an increase in the potential 
level of output and employment growth that is 
compatible with price stability. Third, progress 
with structural reforms throughout the euro 
area can have pronounced positive spillover 
effects between countries, given the increased 
economic interdependence brought about by 
The arguments that follow are usually referred to as being  3 
in favour of or against policy “coordination”, but they can 
be extended to cover the whole range of options between soft 
coordination among the Member States and the outright conferral 
of competences to the EU level (Pisani-Ferry, 2004).
For example, primary (Treaty) law, secondary law, European  4 
Council Resolutions or Presidency conclusions, and EU Council 
conclusions.11
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sharing a single currency. Taken together, these 
structural reforms can increase the euro area’s 
growth potential and employment prospects. 
This, in turn, may signiﬁ   cantly enhance the 
outside perception of the euro area as a vibrant 
and dynamic economy.
At the same time, the single currency provides 
a shield from extra- and intra-euro area shocks, 
which would otherwise put immediate pressure 
on countries to pursue structural reforms. Still, 
this protection reduces but does not eliminate 
the need for reform. Postponing the necessary 
reforms only increases their economic cost as, 
in most cases, this will eventually lead to abrupt 
economic changes through market forces.
There is a wide and ongoing debate concerning 
the relative size of these positive and negative 
effects of a single market and a monetary union 
on the incentives for a single member state to 
reform. However, they can all be interpreted 
as arguments in favour of some form of 
coordination of reforms, especially in the 
case of euro area members. Concerted action 
has helped to deepen the Single Market and 
increase its efﬁ  ciency. In the case of euro area 
members, concerted action can also diminish 
the possibility for individual countries to free 
ride on the efforts of their partners or on the 
shelter that Monetary Union provides against 
extra-euro area shocks. Potentially, concerted 
action may also help to ensure that possible 
negative demand effects of structural reform 
are reﬂ   ected in downward pressure on euro 
area inﬂ  ation. 
Apart from the economic rationale underlying 
the coordination of certain policies at the EU 
level, there may also be political considerations. 
The promotion of economic and social progress 
is the ultimate goal of the EU. Yet many 
levers for promoting growth and jobs still lie 
at the national level. Accordingly, multilateral 
surveillance of these policies may be warranted 
in order to avoid that a lacklustre growth 
performance undermines public conﬁ  dence  in 
the EU and threatens its ﬂ  agship projects, such 
as the single currency and the internal market. In 
addition, the supranational level of governance 
can be used as a “commitment device”, allowing 
governments to shore up domestic commitment 
to reform by pointing to the obligations entered 
into at the supranational level.
2.2.2 BENCHMARKING AND “NATIONAL 
OWNERSHIP”: THE PRACTICE
On the basis of these types of theoretical 
considerations, policy-makers in the EU have 
developed over the years a wide-ranging 
governance framework for the surveillance 
and coordination of structural reforms that 
combines the beneﬁ  ts of partial centralisation – 
i.e. agreements on common guidelines, 
timetables, benchmarks and indicators – with 
the degree of decentralisation which is required 
by the differing economic structures and 
preferences of the Member States.
With regard to supply-side coordination in 
particular, the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy is pursued at European level through 
the Treaty-based processes of EU economic 
policy coordination, as spelled out in 
Article 99 of the EC Treaty (Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines – BEPGs) and Article 128 of 
the Treaty (Employment Guidelines – EGs). In 
addition, the “open method of coordination”, 
which was introduced at Lisbon, has also 
assisted in implementing the Strategy in a 
number of speciﬁ  c policy areas such as pension 
systems (see Box 1).
The current EU governance framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy is structured on the basis of 
a three-year programming period, in order to 
ensure policy coherence given the longer-term 
nature of structural policy. The three-year cycle 
starts with the adoption by the Commission of 
a strategic report, which assesses the progress 
achieved and puts forward the strategic priorities 
for the coming cycle. The Spring European 
Council then establishes the new political 
orientations for the Lisbon Strategy, which 
the Council translates into a set of Integrated 
Guidelines consisting of the BEPGs and the 12
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EGs for a three-year period. On the basis of 
these guidelines, the Member States draw up 
their National Reform Programmes (NRPs) in 
consultation with national stakeholders. Progress 
made with the NRPs is assessed on an annual 
basis through the multilateral surveillance 
framework prescribed in Articles 99 and 124 of 
the Treaty. At the end of the three-year period, 
the state of the implementation of the Integrated 
Guidelines and the National Reform Programmes 
is fully reviewed, taking as the starting-point a 
strategic report by the Commission. 
Box 1
THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION
The open method of coordination (OMC) was introduced at the Lisbon European Council meeting 
in 2000 as an additional means of EU policy coordination, beyond the Treaty-based instruments 
of economic policy coordination (BEPGs and EGs). Although this was the explicit remit of 
the European Council, the academic literature refers loosely to all mechanisms of coordination 
that entail all or some of the following elements: (i) ﬁ  xed guidelines set for the EU, with short, 
medium and long-term goals; (ii) quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 
(iii) European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and (iv) 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review (see e.g. Eberlein, 2004). Consequently, the 
literature does not differentiate between the OMC as adopted by the Lisbon European Council, 
on the one hand, and other mechanisms of policy coordination such as the BEPGs and EGs, 
on the other. In some cases, even the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is put under the general 
heading of the open method of coordination. This, however, is not in line with the practical 
modalities of EU policy coordination (for a discussion, see Ioannou and Niemann, 2003).
From a theoretical perspective, the OMC approach to policy coordination has found support 
among scholars as a “fresh mode of dealing with old political issues in the European Union” 
(Borrás, 2004). As a way of networking decentralised decision-making units by a common 
system of benchmarking, the OMC does not compromise the autonomy of the local units 
(Eberlein, 2004). The method complies with the principle of subsidiarity and allows for more 
decentralised participation by stakeholders. The OMC aims to foster lesson-drawing and policy 
transfer by means of reporting, evaluating and publicising national policies. As such, it aspires to 
reach common goals by policy experimentation instead of producing a binding legal document. 
By relying largely on national policies for the achievement of broad goals set at the European 
level, the OMC minimizes the risks of poor economic coordination, following from uncertainty 
about the required policy measures and the codiﬁ  ed targets for agreed policies (Hodson, 2004). 
Finally, it is also relevant for policy areas that are strongly embedded in national institutions, 
such as welfare policies. 
Against these supporting views, commentators have also found weaknesses in the OMC. Some 
have suggested that the OMC is a round-about way for the Commission to prepare the ground 
for formal legislation (Eberlein, 2004). Others considered the voluntary nature of the OMC, 
which lacks the (legal) possibility of sanctions, to be too weak to ensure the implementation of 
broadly deﬁ  ned common goals. The open nature of the OMC has been questioned, considering 
that participation in practice could be restrictive and the content of best practices could therefore 
be shaped by particular interests. Also, the accessibility and understandable quality of Lisbon 
documentation is considered by some to be inadequate, due to its overabundance. 13
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The EU surveillance framework concerning 
structural reform that is undertaken at national 
level does not foresee strict legal obligations for 
national governments. Thus, binding legal rules, 
such as the antitrust laws of the Single Market, 
or the threat of ﬁ  nancial sanctions, as in the case 
of the SGP, are not foreseen under the Lisbon 
Strategy.5 
Instead, the governance framework functions on 
the basis of a “soft” coordination of the policies 
of the Member States. The latter continue to 
be individually responsible for implementing 
the guidelines agreed at European level. Yet 
the absence of hard coordination cannot be 
interpreted as a complete freedom of action 
for the Member States. The soft coordination 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy thus relies 
on a difﬁ  cult, and sometimes moving, balance 
between national responsibility and European 
coordination and surveillance.
The tools of this soft supply-side coordination 
at European level are: (i) the exchange of 
information among policy-makers; (ii) learning 
from each other’s experience, practices and 
intentions; (iii) national ownership; and 
(iv) the exertion of peer pressure to galvanise 
governments into taking appropriate 
policy action.
During the annual policy cycle, there is ample 
opportunity for policy-makers to exchange 
information and views between themselves and 
the Commission, share good policy practices, 
and discuss successful and unsuccessful 
attempts at tackling speciﬁ  c issues. By sharing 
both good and bad experiences, the cost of 
designing appropriate policies can be reduced 
and policy errors avoided. The policy cycle 
also provides an opportunity to signal to fellow 
Member States one’s policy intentions, which 
may be relevant for others as well. 
In addition to exchanging information and policy 
learning at EU level, there has been a gradual 
consensus over the years that the governments 
of the Member States should exercise “national 
ownership” of their policy programmes, that is, 
they should draft their programmes according 
to their national priorities and circumstances 
in close liaison with national stakeholders, 
and ensure an appropriate execution of these 
programmes. 
The ﬁ  nal policy tools are peer pressure and peer 
support. The Commission assesses in its annual 
reports the achievements and shortcomings of 
each Member State on a bilateral basis, while 
a multilateral peer review exercise also takes 
place within the Council which provides the 
opportunity for the Member States to assess, 
support and/or criticise each other. 
The basic architecture of the current governance 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy appears 
to be adequate for the task at hand given the 
aforementioned theoretical considerations as well 
as practical circumstances. Radical alternatives 
that would entail either a full nationalisation 
of the reform agendas or introducing hard 
methods of coordination would not be suitable, 
also because of the need to allocate policy 
responsibilities to the appropriate level of 
(shared) governance on the basis of the principle 
of subsidiarity (downwards as well as upwards).
Despite the advanced degree of integration 
among the (euro area) Member States, a full 
“communitarisation” of the structural reform 
agenda would be inappropriate, because 
domestic economic structures and preferences 
It should be noted that since the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in  5 
2000, a large part of the legislation for completing and reforming 
the Internal Market has been subsumed under the general 
heading of the Lisbon Strategy since this legislative programme 
pertains to structural reform that is relevant to the EU as a whole. 
This became especially evident with the adoption of the ﬁ  rst 
Community Lisbon Programme in 2005, the implementation of 
which is the prime responsibility of the Commission. In this way, 
the EU has its own “national programme” just as each of the 
27 EU Member States has a National Reform Programme. This 
can be seen as the purely European leg of the Lisbon Strategy 
and concerns policy areas where the EU does have recourse to 
binding legal acts. Moreover, certain reforms foreseen in the 
Lisbon Strategy, both at EU and national level, are linked to the 
use of funds from the EU budget. Against this background, this 
paper focuses on “soft coordination” and the implementation 
of structural reforms at national level where the role of 
benchmarking is especially relevant for the success of the Lisbon 
Strategy. It does not consider the governance framework at the 
European level which largely relies on the so-called “Community 
Method” of adopting and implementing EU law.14
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have still not fully converged. These variations 
in economic structures and preferences call 
for policy-making structures which provide 
sufﬁ  cient  ﬂ   exibility to accommodate such 
differences and offer a substantial margin of 
manoeuvre to national policy-makers to adjust to 
country-speciﬁ  c developments. Even if it could 
be shown to be desirable in theory, resorting 
to a hard method of coordination would also 
be difﬁ   cult to implement due to the present 
incomplete level of political integration in the 
EU. Moreover, in the present circumstances, the 
decentralised character of the economic policy 
framework in Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) also offers scope for healthy policy 
competition among the Member States.
A complete nationalisation of economic policies, 
on the other hand, would not be consistent with 
the economic rationale of the Internal Market 
and EMU, given the possibilities for spillover 
effects of structural reforms, and would be 
contrary to the requirement of the Treaty to 
treat national policies as a matter of common 
concern. 
Given the unfeasibility and/or undesirability of 
these “corner solutions”, the soft coordination 
characteristic of the Lisbon Strategy has been left 
largely untouched ever since its establishment 
in 2000. The 2005 mid-term review (MTR) of 
the Lisbon Strategy (see Box 2) streamlined 
the governance process, whilst leaving intact 
the basic architecture of soft coordination. The 
review placed much emphasis on increasing 
the national ownership of the Strategy. This 
was seen as key to the implementation of the 
Strategy because Member States need to be 
fully committed to the policies they endorse at 
the EU level and must involve the stakeholders, 
such as national parliaments and social partners, 
in drawing up and implementing these policies 
at the national level. This is done through 
overview economic policy documents drawn 
up by the Member States, which are known as 
the National Reform Programmes (NRPs). The 
possibility is left open to Member States to 
include in the NRPs timetables and roadmaps for 
implementing the concrete measures that they 
announce. Member States also had to appoint 
“Lisbon national coordinators” to enhance the 
internal coordination of Lisbon Strategy actions. 
The coordinators regularly meet and exchange 
views with the Commission. It was hoped 
that having a more tailor-made “bottom-up” 
approach, including a stronger involvement of 
all the relevant national actors, would improve 
the implementation record.
However, the mid-term review did not take on 
board some of the other recommendations of the 
Kok High Level Group. Most importantly from 
the viewpoint of this paper, the Commission and 
the Council shied away from taking up the Kok 
recommendation of creating league tables and 
thereby exerting pressure by “naming, praising 
and shaming”. Thus, an opportunity was lost 
during the MTR to introduce a strengthened 
form of benchmarking or possibly ranking, 
thereby neglecting somewhat the potential 
Box 2
THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE LISBON STRATEGY
By 2005, a number of governance shortcomings were identiﬁ  ed to explain the lack of progress 
in the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in its ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of operation. They included: 
(i) the proliferation of objectives and targets and the inconsistency of some of them; (ii) the 
blurring of competences and responsibilities of the various national and European actors; (iii) 
the non-streamlined coexistence of coordination processes at the EU level; (iv) a heavy reporting 
burden at the national level which included separate, policy-speciﬁ   c reporting documents 15
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role played by peer pressure in increasing the 
relatively slow pace of reform. As Pisani-Ferry 
and Sapir (2006) have put it: “Of the three 
key changes advocated in the Kok report, only 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs) drawn up 
by the member states made it off the drawing 
board. The proposals to provide appropriate EU 
funding to support the Lisbon goals, and ‘name 
and shame’ poor performing member states 
were rejected. The driving force of Lisbon 2 is 
thus national ‘ownership’ of the reforms.”
Put in political economy terms, rather than 
strengthening both the national and European 
“governance legs” of the Lisbon Strategy, the 
EU leaders emphasised in the mid-term review 
only the responsibility of Member States 
towards their own national electorates (i.e. the 
national leg), but neglected to draw attention to 
the responsibility of each Member State towards 
its EU partners (i.e. the European leg). 
for product and capital markets, labour markets, social security systems, etc.; (vii) multiple 
assessment reports complicating the monitoring of progress; (viii) lack of public communication 
and awareness; (ix) low effectiveness of the soft coordination procedures and, to a certain extent, 
lack of political will of the Member States to live up to their commitments; (x) lack of incentives 
to enforce and maintain this political will, also due to a lack of national ownership of the Strategy, 
with stakeholders, such as national parliaments and social partners, hardly involved, reducing the 
pressure on governments to implement reforms; (xi) national government inconsistency in the 
programming of and reporting on implementation efforts; (xii) a tendency to shift coordination 
problems to the EU level instead of dealing with them locally. 
In response, the European Council initiated a mid-term review (MTR) of the Lisbon Strategy 
in 2005. A High Level Group headed by Wim Kok carried out an independent assessment, 
which identiﬁ  ed the weaknesses of the Strategy and its governance framework.1 On the basis 
of this assessment and the proposals by the Commission, the European Council of March 2005 
relaunched the Strategy by refocusing its priorities on economic growth and employment, while 
acknowledging the continuing relevance of the social and environmental pillars. The Strategy 
was thus refocused on promoting knowledge and innovation, making the EU an attractive area to 
invest and work in, fostering growth and employment based on social cohesion, and promoting 
sustainable development.
In terms of governance, a number of changes were also introduced, aimed at increasing the 
consistency of national programming, reporting and assessment. The BEPGs and EGs were 
brought together into a single Integrated Guidelines package and were adopted for a period 
of three years, with updates in in-between years. In line with the priorities of the Integrated 
Guidelines, Member States began submitting each autumn single strategic documents, the 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs), covering all relevant policy areas. As a counterpart, the 
Commission also presented a Community Lisbon Programme covering actions to be undertaken 
at the Community level. 
In terms of assessment at the EU level, this also started being carried out in a more integrated 
manner, under the multilateral surveillance procedures of the BEPGs and the EGs. The 
Commission assesses the NRPs and reports to the European Council by way of a single Annual 
Progress Report. On the basis of this report, and input by the Council of Ministers, the Spring 
European Council decides on any necessary adjustments to the Integrated Guidelines for the 
following year. 
1   Kok, W. et al. (2004).16
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Whilst national ownership is deﬁ  nitely 
necessary, it is not a panacea. In fact, some 
observers have argued that increasing the 
involvement of national parliaments may not 
solve the Strategy’s implementation problems, 
since parliaments have long experienced 
difﬁ  culties in exercising control over complex 
policy  ﬁ   elds. Research by Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir (2006) and Radlo and Bates (2006) 
indeed shows that the involvement of national 
parliaments has thus far been rather limited. 
Moreover, the increased politicisation brought 
about by enhancing national ownership may in 
some cases also complicate decision-making at 
the national level rather than facilitate it. 
Accordingly, the national leg of the governance 
framework should not be seen as substituting 
for the European leg. Rather, both legs should 
be seen as complementary. Benchmarking at the 
European level can shore up national ownership 
because it can be used as a tool to inform the 
national stakeholders and wider public about the 
relative performance of the country in question 
and thereby focus the efforts of national 
policy-makers and enhance popular support.
2.3  BENCHMARKING AS A BUTTRESS OF SOFT 
COORDINATION
The fact that some coordination of structural 
reforms is desirable, and that soft coordination 
seems more suitable than alternative methods 
of governance, does not provide a guarantee 
for the success of the Lisbon Strategy given 
the difﬁ   cult political economy of structural 
reforms faced by EU national governments. 
Borrás and Greve have thus noted that the 
Lisbon Strategy “might be permanently on 
the fringes of failure” as its success depends 
on political commitment and national 
implementation (Borrás, 2004). Indeed, by 
relying exclusively on learning, ownership 
and peer pressure, soft coordination lacks the 
disciplining or enforcement instruments that 
might be needed to guarantee that the policy 
measures considered necessary or desirable 
are actually implemented. 
Accordingly, the question remains as to how 
the incentive structure of the EU governance 
framework for implementing the Lisbon 
Strategy can be improved in order to increase 
political commitment, whilst keeping within the 
boundaries of soft coordination and respecting 
the sovereignty of national governments.
Indeed, a prime weakness of soft coordination 
of Member States’ policies in the policy areas 
covered by the BEPGs and EGs is that one of 
the few tools available at European level for a 
better implementation of reforms, namely 
precise assessment and peer pressure, can 
remain permanently insufﬁ   cient to enforce 
policy change. In the end, little progress can be 
made at European level in assessing policy and 
exerting pressure on governments if it is not 
backed by concrete, quantitative evidence.6
It is in this context that benchmarking has been 
put forward as a tool to bolster soft coordination 
of economic policies. Benchmarking originated 
as a management tool, where it involves the 
analysis of internal practices and processes in 
systematic comparison with those of others in 
order to identify and implement “best practices” 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2004). Benchmarking can 
be both a tool for learning from the successful 
policies of others and for providing incentives 
for reform. A comparison with other countries 
provides information about the current situation 
at home, facilitates the exchange of best 
practices and encourages peer pressure, both at 
the European level (e.g. among the Ministers 
in charge of reform) and at the national level 
(e.g. by mobilising actors interested in reform). 
Benchmarking enhances transparency and 
reduces information costs, thereby reinforcing 
the stimulus to implement structural reforms. 
Reference to the experience of other countries 
may help overcome domestic resistance to 
reforms, as this can take away uncertainty about 
the outcome of alternative policies, doubts 
about their merits or the motivation of their 
proponents. Therefore, as a policy instrument, 
In this regard, the monitoring of national ﬁ  scal policies at the  6 
EU level is made relatively easier through the regular recourse to 
(relatively) well-deﬁ  ned datasets and quantitative analysis.17
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benchmarking is well suited to the EU context 
of supply-side coordination. 
Nevertheless, benchmarking countries’ economic 
policy performance also has some limitations. 
In contrast with benchmarking at the company 
level, benchmarking within the EU is essentially 
a consensual exercise and lacks some ultimate 
form of coercive power. Intergovernmental 
benchmarking is dependent on peer review and 
“naming and shaming” for its effectiveness 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2004). A general criticism 
of benchmarking is that there can be a 
tension between learning from others and the 
implementation of successful policies. It is 
important to avoid delivering inﬂ  exible policy 
messages which do not take account of national 
policy priorities and country speciﬁ  cities, while 
an excessively mechanical approach can also 
lead to incorrect conclusions (EPC, 2006). 
Other arguments voiced against the use of 
benchmarking in general and ranking in 
particular in the EU policy framework are the 
diversity of the economies of the EU Member 
States, statistical/policy deﬁ   ciencies of the 
indicators, the possible loss of information due to 
the benchmarking method used, too much focus 
on quantitative indicators over qualitative ones, 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour by Member 
States that want to portray their policies as the 
most successful, the accreditation of simpliﬁ  ed 
policy blueprints, difﬁ   culty in weighting the 
various policy areas of the Lisbon Strategy, and 
a lack of an adequate methodological framework 
for conducting such an exercise.
These arguments can partly be countered by 
the modalities of the benchmarking method 
used. A good method of benchmarking needs to 
take into account the starting level of a country 
in a particular policy area, distinguish among 
the main policy areas being benchmarked, and 
ensure a high degree of legitimacy by placing 
an independent arbiter like the Commission in 
charge of the whole process.
Successful benchmarking also requires careful 
consideration of the indicators used and the 
context in which these are assessed. Therefore, 
in the EU any quantitative benchmarking should 
always be accompanied by much qualitative 
evidence and assessment. In addition, 
the quantitative results themselves of a 
benchmarking or ranking exercise need to be 
interpreted in some way because even “league 
tables” need qualiﬁ  cation.
Finally, in order to account for national policy 
priorities and peculiarities, it has been suggested 
to let each Member State decide on the 
indicators on which it wants to be benchmarked. 
Member States could thus choose their priorities 
(and possibly speciﬁ  c indicators) ex ante, and 
then be subjected to independent assessment 
ex post. This could be a way to reconcile national 
ownership and EU benchmarking, thus ensuring 
national ownership of the benchmarking 
exercise itself. There are, however, clearly 
limits as to how far such a practice can go 
without weakening too much the purpose of 
benchmarking. In particular, transparency 
and comparability would be undermined if 
each Member State were simply to choose 
individually the indicators of its preference. 
In order to maintain the disciplinary effect 
of benchmarking, a common approach and a 
common list of indicators need to be agreed. In 
addition, this common list could be at the core 
of the benchmarking exercise and, beyond that, 
each Member State could be benchmarked on a 
further list of indicators of its choice.
2.4  INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND 
BENCHMARKING: COMPARING THE 
LISBON STRATEGY WITH OTHER POLICY 
APPROACHES
Benchmarking has been used in other EU policy 
domains beyond structural reform, most notably 
in the process for adopting the euro. Adopting 
the euro depends upon the sustainable fulﬁ  lment 
of a number of convergence criteria. At regular 
intervals, the European Commission and the 
ECB assess – on the basis of these criteria – 
a country’s readiness to join the euro area 
(Article 121 of the EC Treaty). The so-called 
“Maastricht criteria” were used at the start of 18
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Stage Three of EMU to determine which Member 
States were ready to adopt the single currency. 
The criteria are generally seen as a key factor 
explaining the successful convergence process 
laying the grounds for the start of Monetary 
Union in 1999 with 11 Member States.
Several arguments have been put forward to 
explain the success of this convergence process: 
(i) Member States had a strong incentive 
to comply with these criteria as the cost of 
non-membership was considered substantial; 
(ii) the assessment of the criteria was 
relatively straightforward as they were few 
in number and easily measurable; (iii) the 
rationale underlying the criteria was (broadly) 
accepted; (iv) the governance framework 
was enshrined in the Treaty and clearly 
spelled out the roles of each institution and 
the relevant decision-making procedures; (v) 
the convergence process focused the minds 
of the public at large, allowing national 
governments to use the criteria as a justiﬁ  cation 
for implementing necessary reforms; and 
(vi) economic actors gradually came to believe 
in the success of the convergence process, which 
in turn facilitated the fulﬁ  lment of the criteria 
(e.g. by lowering inﬂ  ation expectations). 
A lighter form of benchmarking is employed in 
another key EU policy domain, namely the 
internal market. Every year, the European 
Commission publishes an Internal Market 
Scoreboard, which quantiﬁ   es Member States’ 
performance in transposing and implementing 
internal market legislation. These scoreboards 
have been in some cases instrumental in 
pressuring the laggards to speed up the 
application of internal market rules, in particular 
by raising public pressure.7 The transposition 
deﬁ  cit – the percentage of directives that have 
not been transposed into national law in time – 
has indeed fallen from 6% in 1997 to 1.2% 
in 2007. 
The use of benchmarking as a public policy 
tool is of course not unique to the EU. Certain 
international organisations also rely on 
benchmarking in the exercise of their mandate. 
The OECD evaluates on a regular basis the 
economic situation in its member states. These 
evaluations are conducted in a multilateral 
setting where governments can compare their 
policy experiences, identify good practices, 
and apply peer pressure. The results of the 
OECD country surveys generally receive wide 
coverage in domestic media and can thus raise 
public awareness and pressure. 
In order to underpin the multilateral surveillance 
of structural policies, the OECD started in 
2005 its “Going for Growth” initiative, which 
complements the regular country reviews. It is 
a benchmarking exercise focused on the sources 
of economic growth. The process starts with 
the identiﬁ  cation of each country’s weaknesses, 
by measuring its performance on a number of 
structural indicators with a clear link to GDP 
per capita. On the basis of a cross-country 
comparison of performance and policy settings, 
a ﬁ  xed number of policy priorities are identiﬁ  ed 
for each country. The quantitative exercise is 
complemented by judgement as the indicator-
based priorities are supplemented by judgemental 
indicators based on country-speciﬁ  c knowledge. 
Countries’ progress in tackling these priorities 
is reviewed on a regular basis. By employing 
a precise method for deriving priorities and 
measuring performance, the approach of the Going 
for Growth initiative increases transparency. At 
the same time, the focus on GDP per capita limits 
policy coverage and the possibility of dealing 
with multiple objectives.
The IMF also conducts regular country reviews. 
Much like the OECD, these so-called Article 
IV reviews are initiated by a report from IMF 
staff, which is subsequently the subject of 
multilateral examination at the level of the IMF 
Board. Although these reviews do not rely on 
explicit benchmarking, they do very often have 
recourse to cross-country comparisons. In some 
cases, the IMF’s benchmarking is linked to 
pecuniary incentives, that is, the loan ﬁ  nancing 
For example, Belgium overhauled its procedures for  7 
implementing EU directives in 2004 following press articles 
about the country’s lacklustre score on the Internal Market 
Scoreboard (De Standaard, 12 February 2004).19
ECB






undertaken by the organisation. In the context 
of its lending role, the IMF lays down speciﬁ  c 
conditions – including “structural benchmarks” 
– governing the provision of IMF loans to 
countries facing balance of payments problems. 
The compliance with these conditions is 
regularly reviewed by the IMF Board. Under 
certain circumstances, including an appropriate 
level of ownership of IMF programmes, such 
“conditional ﬁ  nancing” can be a powerful tool 
for ensuring the implementation of (structural) 
reforms by recipients of IMF loans. Finally, 
the IMF also has recourse to benchmarks for 
monitoring the implementation by Member 
States of speciﬁ   c codes of conduct (e.g. on 
transparency and statistics). 
Benchmarking is thus widely used as a policy 
analysis and assessment tool in a number of 
policy contexts and in various formats. As the 
above overview indicates, the effectiveness of 
benchmarking depends on a number of factors. 
First, the political salience of the objectives 
towards which benchmarking is used, as well as 
a clear political and legal a priori commitment 
(e.g. participation in EMU), can be key in the 
success of the benchmarking exercise and the 
achievement of the end goal. 
Second, the focus on a single overall goal 
(e.g. adoption of the euro), or a relatively small 
number of objectives (e.g. reducing inﬂ  ation, 
raising GDP per capita) provides transparency, 
and can be used to gain acceptance of the 
process and thereby also increase commitment 
further.
Third, a transparent and objective framework 
for conducting the benchmarking exercise that 
can also be applied relatively easily across 
countries can also help to promote acceptance 
among different policy-makers, especially in 
case they do not share the same short-term goals 
or incentive structures. In this regard, the OECD 
Going for Growth experience indicates that 
methodological transparency, in combination 
with sound judgement, as well as country-
speciﬁ  c prioritisation, can be useful. 
Fourth, links to pecuniary incentives, as is the 
case with the IMF’s conditionality, can also be 
a powerful incentive, although such ﬁ  nancial 
conditionality can create much political 
controversy and needs to be accompanied by an 
adequate level of genuine commitment on the 
part of national authorities. Unless an adequate 
level of national ownership is secured, the 
likelihood of implementation of the programme 
is likely to be poor (Broughton, 2003).
Fifth, wide public communication and media 
coverage can also work as a strong element of 
pressure for policy-makers to deliver. At the 
same time, there may be a trade-off between 
transparency and the breadth of objectives. 
For example, focusing on GDP per capita as 
the dependent variable may be too restrictive 
for a policy that identiﬁ   es social welfare or 
environmental sustainability as major objectives. 
Sixth, as for the quantitative indicators used 
in benchmarking, although the indicators 
related to policy instruments (input indicators) 
may be more directly applicable in the short 
run, performance targets (output indicators), 
probably over a longer period of time, may be 
equally powerful depending on other factors 
surrounding the benchmarking exercise, such 
as those mentioned above. In any case, it is 
important that the indicators chosen not only 
make good analytical sense, but also enjoy 
political legitimacy.
Finally, it would also seem that whatever the 
form of benchmarking, it is important that it 
is backed by thorough (qualitative) analysis, 
conducted by credible and objective arbiters, 
which in practice are likely to be independent 
and highly regarded organisations governed by 
transparent rules.20
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2.5  BENCHMARKING IN THE LISBON STRATEGY 
AT PRESENT
In the case of the Lisbon Strategy, the incentive 
structure of benchmarking is not as stringent as 
in these other cases and there is therefore a need 
to develop the incentive structure arising from 
benchmarking in parallel with its counterpart, i.e. 
national ownership. Thus, whichever mode of 
benchmarking one decides upon, it is important 
that the approach remains “two-handed”. The 
greater role for Member States in setting their 
Lisbon priorities should be complemented by 
a critical assessment of their implementation at 
the European level. 
Since 2000 the use of benchmarking in the 
context of the Lisbon governance framework 
has been gradually developed. In particular, the 
European Commission made qualitative 
assessments on an annual basis of the national 
programmes of Member States.8 For the purpose 
of its assessments, the Commission developed a 
long list of structural indicators which it has 
continued to develop and has also made publicly 
available.9 On 8 December 2003, in order to 
provide guidance with regard to the structural 
indicators to be used in these assessments, the 
Council of Ministers adopted a shortlist of 
14 structural indicators. Since then, the 
Commission has used in various ways this 
ofﬁ  cially agreed shortlist of structural indicators. 
In 2004 the list was used in tabular format to 
illustrate the top three and bottom three 
performers for each of the 14 indicators, both in 
terms of levels and changes. After the 2005 mid-
term review, the Commission used the list in its 
Annual Progress Report to indicate the levels of 
and changes in the 14 structural indicators, 
showing EU-wide averages, thereby toning 
down somewhat the cross-country comparison 
element and arguably reducing the already 
limited role of quantitative benchmarking in its 
assessments. The ECOFIN Council has also 
used these indicators to make its own assessment 
of progress achieved with structural reform.
The shortlist of 14 structural indicators 
covering economic reform, social cohesion 
and environmental sustainability has been 
maintained and is the only ofﬁ  cially  adopted 
list of such indicators in the EU. The agreement 
on the list was the outcome of a difﬁ  cult 
compromise. It was agreed by the General 
Affairs Council, bringing together the different 
perspectives of the ECOFIN, Employment and 
Environment Council formations. It clearly 
entailed a difﬁ  cult political compromise that had 
to take into account the different preferences 
of the then 15 EU Member States, as well as 
three different policy domains (economic, 
social and environmental). Being the result of 
the deliberations of no less than four different 
Council conﬁ  gurations, it can be argued that this 
list enjoys political legitimacy. Moreover, it is 
short enough to be easily comprehensible and 
therefore also suitable for exerting peer pressure 
by focusing attention and stimulating public 
awareness.
It may be noted, however, that following critical 
remarks in 2006 about the outcome of the 2005 
mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy,10 
the Commission and the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) – an advisory committee to 
the (ECOFIN) Council – have been deliberating 
further about the use of the structural indicators 
in benchmarking, also in the context of the annual 
multilateral surveillance by the Commission and 
the Council of the Lisbon NRPs. Consequently, 
the EPC has recently taken the initiative to 
develop a longer list of 22 structural indicators 
which relate solely to economic reforms (and 
not social or environmental) as laid down in the 
Integrated Guidelines (BEPGs and EGs). These 
indicators have not, however, been adopted 
by the Council and therefore do not enjoy the 
political legitimacy of the 14 structural indicators. 
Nevertheless, as a relevant EPC report notes:
Before the introduction in 2005 of the single documents known  8 
as the National Reform Programmes, the Member States adopted 
multiple national programmes each year covering a variety of 
policy areas (e.g. Cardiff Reports on Structural Reform, National 
Action Plans on Employment) which the Commission assessed 
individually.
See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1133,4 9 
7800773,1133_47802588&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
In their paper of 14 March 2006 entitled “Last exit to Lisbon”,  10 
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir repeated the call for the use of league 
tables, as originally suggested by the Kok report.21
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“The main reason for using indicators for 
benchmarking and ranking is the positive impact 
of transparency on the incentive structure. As 
argued in the Kok Report, enhancing the 
comparison at EU level and stimulating peer 
pressure produce ‘clear incentives for the Member 
States to deliver on their commitments by 
measuring and comparing their respective 
performance and facilitating exchange of best 
practice’. […] the pressure of an external anchor 
may help overcome domestic resistance to reforms. 
It also helps to identify the current position on 
structural reform, and to determine priorities and 
areas for the exchange of best practice. Moreover, 
benchmarking exercises at EU level help stimulate 
an evaluation culture. Regular comparison with 
other countries’ performances in speciﬁ  c ﬁ  elds can 
spur monitoring and evaluation routines. 
Identiﬁ   cation of best practice policies helps 
countries in avoiding policy mistakes and 
contributes to mutual learning. Benchmarking 
should lead to a return to, and re-examination of, 
the policies which generated the results.”11
In this context, it should be noted that – at the 
request of the ECOFIN Council – the EPC is 
developing a sound and transparent methodology 
to monitor and assess the reforms undertaken 
under the Lisbon umbrella. One strand of this 
work is aimed at identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of each Member State by singling out 
areas where Member States are underperforming 
relative to a benchmark. This work is expected to 
be ﬁ  nalised in the course of 2008. 
2.6  INCREASING PEER PRESSURE THROUGH 
RANKING
Ranking is a special form of benchmarking in that 
it does not only provide a comparison against a 
particular benchmark, but also provides an order 
of performance. In the context of the Lisbon 
Strategy, there have been several proposals to 
introduce ranking, most notably – as pointed out 
above – by the Kok High Level Group in 2005 
and Pisani-Ferry and Sapir in 2006. 
Nevertheless, so far, ranking has not been 
incorporated into the governance of the Lisbon 
Strategy. An argument against ranking is that it 
increases the risks associated with the delivery 
of inﬂ  exible policy messages which do not take 
account of the starting level of Member States 
or their national priorities. Also, summarising 
the performance of countries in a single ﬁ  gure 
is inherently a simpliﬁ  cation, which can lead to 
the loss or distortion of information. However, 
an argument in favour of ranking is that it caters 
for a higher degree of transparency than other 
forms of benchmarking, which in turn facilitates 
comparison and communication, stimulates peer 
pressure and focuses attention. 
The transparency effect of ranking can be 
further increased by the combination of various 
quantitative indicators into a single composite 
indicator. This has the advantage of depicting 
the overall achievements of the Member States 
by means of one single indicator, thereby 
effectively creating an economic reform “league 
table”. This obviously strengthens the incentives 
for reform, encourages peer pressure and focuses 
public debate. The drawback of this approach is 
that it necessarily entails an even higher degree 
of simpliﬁ  cation, as some information may get 
lost. In turn, drawing policy lessons and deriving 
best practices may become more complicated, 
as it is not immediately obvious where a 
Member State over- and underperforms. By 
way of analogy, a football league table indicates 
which teams perform best, but it does not show 
whether this good performance is due to having 
good defenders or even better strikers.
This drawback can be partly addressed in the 
methodology used to construct the ranking. 
Moreover, it should be stressed that in monitoring 
progress with structural reforms, an eclectic and 
wide-ranging approach, combining a composite 
indicator ranking with quantitative information 
on the performance of countries on each indicator, 
as well as qualitative analysis, is of the essence. 
An overall Lisbon ranking should be considered 
as the start of the assessment of the performance 
of the EU Member States, and not the ﬁ  nal word. 
To return to the analogy above, the teams at 
EPC (2006). 11 22
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the bottom of the table should see their overall 
position as an incentive to look closer at the 
reasons underlying their underperformance.
3  RANKING THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
EU MEMBER STATES
3.1  A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO RANKING 
THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
EU MEMBER STATES
The ranking presented in this Section is 
based on the structural indicators that were 
commonly agreed by the governments 
of the Member States in December 2003 
(see Table 1 below) and have been used to 
monitor the Lisbon Strategy. For a complete 
picture of the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy by each Member State, a ranking based 
on all 14 structural indicators should be divided 
into 3 groups, corresponding to the main pillars 
of the Strategy: economic performance/reform 
(8 indicators), social cohesion (3 indicators) 
and environmental sustainability (3 indicators). 
A non-differentiated assessment would raise 
analytical problems, as: (i) the economic 
indicators outnumber the other indicators and 
would thus receive too much weight; (ii) the 
indicators measure very different things; and 
(iii) the overall picture may be blurred by inter-
pillar trade-offs.
In this paper we limit our analysis to the 
economic dimension of the Lisbon Strategy, 
which offers better indicators in terms of data 
quality and coverage (see Section 3.2). 
Therefore, we present a ranking strategy for 
the EU25 Member States based on composite 
indicators which synthesize in one number the 
information contained in the eight structural 
indicators measuring economic performance.12 
The methodology is not speciﬁ   c to the 
indicators presented here, and can be applied 
to other indicators as well.13
Bulgaria and Romania are not included due to lack of data.  12 
Furthermore, their recent entry into the EU did preclude their full 
participation in the peer review process of the Lisbon Strategy.
A possibility would be to use the methodology to construct a  13 
ranking based on a list of 22 indicators that has been proposed in 
the EPC “Report on Structural Indicators” (ECFIN/EPC(2006)
REP/55713) for use in the future surveillance of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines.
Table 1 Lisbon structural indicators 
Indicator Economic growth Measurement 
1 GDP per capita Index EU-25 average
2  Labour productivity Index EU-25 average
3  Employment rate * Percentage total population
4  Employment rate of older workers * Percentage total population 55- 64 
5  Youth educational attainment (20-24) * Perc. pop. aged 20 to 24 with at least upper sec. educ
6  Gross domestic expenditure on R&D Percentage of GDP 
7  Comparative price levels Index EU-25 average 
8  Business investment Percentage of GDP 
Social Cohesion
9  At risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers * Percentage with income below risk -level 
10  Long-term unemployment rate * Percentage active population
11  Dispersion of regional employment rates * Coefﬁ  cient variation NUTS-regions within country 
Environment
12  Greenhouse gas emissions Index basis year ('90) 
13  Energy intensity of the economy  Kgoe per 1000 euro (1995 prices)  
14 Volume of freight transport relative to GDP Index basis year ('95) tonne-km/GDP * 
* Indicators disaggregated by gender.23
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3.2  DATA QUALITY OF THE STRUCTURAL 
INDICATORS
No composite indicator will be better than its 
component indicators, the quality of which in 
turn depends on the quality, availability and 
comparability of the relevant data. The adoption 
of the shortlist of structural indicators by the 
Council, after a process of political negotiation 
involving various trade-offs, has been described 
in Section 2. While the indicators used enjoy 
political legitimacy, not every indicator is easily 
interpretable from a strictly economic 
perspective.14
The quality of the data for each of the structural 
indicators varies, with the economic and 
environmental indicators being generally 
of high quality and comparability. The data 
availability for the eight indicators measuring 
economic performance and reform is good, 
whereas the three environmental indicators 
are available one year later than the economic 
indicators. The quality of the social cohesion 
indicators is mixed, with low data quality in the 
case of indicator 9 (at-risk-of-poverty rates) and 
limited data availability in the case of indicator 
11 (dispersion of regional unemployment rates). 
The only social cohesion indicator which covers 
all or most of the EU25 Member States (i.e. all 
of the EU excluding Bulgaria and Romania) 
is indicator 10 (long-term unemployment), 
which is highly correlated with the employment 
indicators among the economic indicators. For 
these reasons, in this paper, a ranking based 
only on the eight structural indicators relating 
to economic performance/reform is presented.15 
For the sake of brevity, these eight indicators 
are referred to below as the “Lisbon structural 
indicators” or simply the “structural indicators”. 
3.3  METHODOLOGY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE COMPOSITE INDICATOR
Combining data in a composite indicator 
necessarily involves choices on the 
normalisation of the data, the treatment of 
missing data, the weighting of the components 
for the construction of the composite indicator, 
and the (graphical) presentation of the ranking. 
The main choices made in the construction of 
the composite indicator proposed here are:
1. Normalisation: The structural indicators 
are normalised by dividing each country’s 
score by the score of the best-performing 
country (i.e. the country with the best value 
of the considered indicator). As a result, the 
normalised indicators are all measured on a 
scale ranging between 0 and 1. This method of 
normalisation provides comparable indicators 
that contain information on the performance 
of Member States relative to each other, 
and on the magnitude of these performance 
differences. Since the normalisation method 
is dependent on the differences between the 
country scores, it is potentially sensitive to 
outliers. Sensitivity analysis shows that our 
results are not signiﬁ  cantly  inﬂ  uenced  by 
possible outliers.16 Indicators for which a high 
score corresponds to a bad performance are 
transformed, so that a high score corresponds 
Among the economic indicators, indicator 7 (the price level of a  14 
country compared with the EU average) is the most difﬁ  cult to 
interpret due to the large difference in starting levels among EU 
Member States. This indicator can be considered as a measure 
of market integration and, accordingly, we recalculated it as the 
difference from the EU average price level, with the smallest 
difference considered the best-performing country and the 
largest difference the worst-performing country. However, large 
countries do better on this indicator since it is calculated as an 
index of the EU25 weighted average.
It should be recognised that some correlations may exist between  15 
the eight economic indicators themselves. Concerning the 
levels of the indicators, the correlation is high between GDP 
and productivity and between the overall employment and the 
employment of old workers. The correlation is relatively high also 
for other indicators. Concerning the changes in the indicators, the 
correlation is generally low, with the exception of that between 
GDP and productivity and that between the overall employment 
and the employment of old workers. A thorough examination 
in terms of theory and empirical evidence of these correlations 
would go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
correlation matrices for the levels of and the changes in the eight 
economic indicators are provided in Annex A2.1.
In order to check the robustness of our results we carefully  16 
checked the data for outliers. A possible outlier is the high score 
of Luxembourg for indicator 1 (GDP per person employed) and 
indicator 2 (labour productivity per person employed). Sensitivity 
analysis shows that the exclusion of Luxembourg does not alter 
the results (see Annex A2.2 and Table 8). A normalisation 
achieved through ranking countries on the basis of each of the 
structural indicators would not be sensitive to outliers, but has the 
disadvantage that the information contained in the magnitude of 
the differences in the indicators’ scores across countries is lost.24
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to a good performance for all the normalised 
indicators. Annex A2.2 gives a more detailed 
description of how indicators are normalised.
2. Weighting: For the construction of the 
composite indicator, country-speciﬁ  c weights 
are determined by using beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
analysis, a form of data envelopment analysis 
(Cherchye et al., 2004).17 The advantage of 
this method is that the weights are country-
speciﬁ   c and determined by the result of a 
maximisation procedure, instead of arbitrarily 
choosing a single set of weights for all 
countries (such as equal weighting). For each 
country, the weighting scheme chosen results 
in the best composite indicator score for that 
country, subject to general constraints on the 
set of weights.18 The deﬁ  ning characteristic of 
the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis is that higher 
weights are assigned to the indicators on 
which a country performs well relative to the 
best-performing country. Put simply, each 
country is depicted from its best possible 
angle. This approach helps to take into 
consideration the performance environment 
of each country. We provide greater detail on 
the weighting method and its consequences 
below (see Section 3.4) and in Annex A2.3.
3. Presentation:  Composite indicators are 
constructed for both the level of and the 
change in the structural indicators, using 
different country-speciﬁ  c weights for each 
(on the basis of the beneﬁ   t of the doubt 
approach). The chosen form of presentation 
gives combined information on both the level 
and change dimensions simultaneously, and 
allows for a comparison of the progress of 
countries with similar starting levels.
3.4  THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT APPROACH
3.4.1 BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT WEIGHTING
Setting weights for each country with the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt analysis involves ﬁ  nding the set 
of weights that maximises a given composite 
indicator. The composite indicator is deﬁ  ned 
as the weighted average of the performance of 
a country on a set of n indicators relative to the 
weighted performance of the best-performing 
country, under the same set of weights for both 
countries. It is possible to write the composite 











where Ij is the nx1 column vector containing the 
values of the n indicators for country j; Ibench is 
the nx1 column vector containing the values of 
the indicators for the benchmark country, which 
is deﬁ  ned as the country that achieves the best 
performance (i.e. the country that maximises 
the denominator of the CI) under the set of 
n weights contained in the vector w*. The 
weights in w* are chosen in order to maximise 
the composite indicator, CI, for country j. Any 
other set of weights would result in a lower 
composite indicator score for country j. The 
maximum value for CI is 1, which is obtained 
when there exists a set of weights for which 
country j itself is the best-performing country.
The beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis thus results in 
country-speciﬁ   c weights which provide each 
country with its best possible score relative to the 
benchmark country, which helps to legitimise 
cross-country comparisons.19 The country-
speciﬁ  c weights determined by the beneﬁ  t of the 
doubt analysis are based on the performance of 
each country and are therefore less arbitrary than 
using a single set of weights for all countries 
determined by consulting experts or political 
compromise. By showing every country in the 
most  ﬂ   attering way, the beneﬁ   t of the doubt 
The paper does not discuss the feasibility and appropriateness of  17 
alternative approaches, such as a pure DEA or factor analysis. 
This could be an interesting avenue for further research.
The minimal constraints are that the weights cannot be negative  18 
and should sum up to 1.
The weighting scheme obtained with the beneﬁ  t of the doubt  19 
analysis can be interpreted as revealed priorities of the policy-
makers. Interpreting the endogenously selected weights in this 
way requires the assumption that there is a causal relationship 
among policy priorities/actions and good performance on the 
indicators measuring them. However, policy-makers may lack 
the policy instruments to intervene or the indicator scores may be 
exogenous in the sense that they do not only reﬂ  ect the outcome 
of policy decisions and actions, but they also reﬂ  ect factors that 
are not under the control of policy-makers.25
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approach addresses the criticism that the ranking 
method chosen insufﬁ   ciently recognises the 
peculiarities of different countries.
3.4.2 WEIGHTING SCHEMES AND RESTRICTIONS
In order to construct a composite indicator that 
ranks countries according to the Lisbon structural 
indicators, there are considerations that speak in 
favour of some weight restrictions. These have to 
do with the fact that without any weight restrictions 
a country may outperform all others on the basis 
of only one indicator. This may or may not be 
acceptable, depending on normative judgements 
about the policy orientation of a speciﬁ  c country. 
In the case of the Lisbon structural indicators, 
the adoption by the Council of eight structural 
indicators in the economic sphere – apart from 
giving them political legitimacy – implies that 
all of them should be taken into account, at least 
to a minimum degree.20 Accordingly, our 
composite indicator should not be exclusively 
determined by one single indicator.
A strict interpretation of the Council’s decision 
would support equal weighting since the 
Council did not emphasise one indicator more 
than another. A less strict interpretation, taking 
into account the policy compromise described 
earlier, would suggest that equal weighting of 
the structural indicators would be insufﬁ  ciently 
representative of the situation in individual 
countries.
The use of beneﬁ   t of the doubt weighting 
addresses the criticism that a particular set of 
weights, applied to all Member States, does not 
take country-speciﬁ  c differences into account. 
However, the beneﬁ  t of the doubt method also 
requires a set of weight restrictions. The most 
basic approach would entail only two minimal 
restrictions, namely that the weights add up to 
100% and cannot be negative. More elaborate 
restrictions on the maximal or minimal weights 
can, however, be deemed appropriate, in order 
to prevent too much weight being assigned 
to a single indicator and too little to the rest. 
However, restricting the maximum weights 
assigned to a single indicator reduces the 
possibilities for a country to reach the highest 
composite indicator score (1). If the possible set 
of weights is restricted to one for all countries, 
only one country obtains a composite indicator 
score of 1. Equal weights for all indicators are 
an example.
As the weight restrictions determine the 
possibilities for different composite indicator 
scores, they can inﬂ  uence the result and need 
legitimacy for the ranking to be acceptable. 
However, since a set of weight restrictions 
allows for a greater variety among countries 
than a single set of weights, it will be easier to 
obtain consensus on the weight restrictions than 
on any particular set of weights. It can also be 
considered an advantage that the beneﬁ  t of the 
doubt method is not an entirely mechanical 
exercise since the weight restrictions are a 
matter of political choice, while the results are 
transparent and equal treatment is ensured once 
the weight restrictions are set. 
The weight restrictions used in the ranking 
presented here should therefore not be considered 
as the only possible ones, but as an example.21 
Our weight restrictions contain both a minimum 
value of the total weight for each indicator (5%) 
and a maximum value (30%), and are motivated 
by the following considerations: 
1. Without a minimum restriction on the 
weights, some of the structural indicators 
receive zero weights (see Annex), which 
would seem contrary to the Council’s 
agreement to use each of the structural 
indicators to measure progress with the 
Lisbon Strategy.
The component indicators of other composite indicators are  20 
usually selected on the basis of established mutual relationships 
or on the basis of expert opinion. In the context of the Lisbon 
Strategy, a possible example of the former would be to determine 
the structural indicators, and their relative weights, on the basis 
of an economic model explaining which are the most important 
areas of reform in terms of contribution to economic growth. 
This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
As a comparison, the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis is also carried  21 
out with other weight restrictions. The results are discussed in 
Annex A2.3.26
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2. The minimum weight restriction leaves 
more than half of the total weight (60%) to 
be allocated freely. 
3. The maximum weight restriction ensures 
that the ranking is not overly dependent on a 
single indicator, also to prevent measurement 
problems.
4. The weight restrictions reduce to some 
extent the possible changes in the assigned 
weights, which facilitate the comparison of 
rankings in different years.
3.5  RANKING ON THE BASIS OF THE LISBON 
STRUCTURAL INDICATORS
The analysis has two main goals. The ﬁ  rst is to 
assess the state of implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2000, at its start, and in 2006. The 
second is to assess the performance of Member 
States during the period 2000-2006.
To achieve the ﬁ   rst goal, we compute the 
composite indicator for the level of the economic 
structural indicators in 2006 and 2000. To achieve 
the second goal, i.e. to evaluate the performance 
of Member States during the period 2000-2006, 
we proceed in two steps. First (Step 1), we look 
at the overall progress that Member States have 
made between 2000 and 2006. The overall 
progress is measured by the difference between 
the composite indicator in 2006 and 2000. 
We also look at the progress made by 
Member States compared with their starting 
level in 2000.
One problem with the measure of overall 
progress is that Member States that recorded 
a good performance in dimensions, in which 
they previously scored relatively weakly, 
are assigned low overall progress. This is a 
consequence of the way the overall progress 
measure is calculated under the beneﬁ  t of the 
doubt analysis: by assigning lower weights 
to indicators where the country previously 
scored rather badly, progress made on these 
indicators is not reﬂ   ected as much in the 
overall composite score. 
To resolve this issue and fully recognise Member 
States’ performance, we compute in Step 2 the 
composite indicator for the change in the 
economic structural indicators between 2000 
and 2006. This composite indicator assigns the 
greatest weights to those indicators where the 
country concerned has recorded the strongest 
increases over the years. Since this latter 
composite indicator provides a gauge of the 
improvement achieved by Member States in 
each of the indicators which may be concealed 
by our weighting method for computing overall 
progress scores, we call it underlying progress. 
Finally, we create groups of countries, ranking 
them on the basis of the combinations of overall 
progress and underlying progress.22
Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 present the analysis of 
the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda in 
2006 and 2000 and look at the overall progress 
between 2000 and 2006. Section 3.5.3 measures 
the underlying progress of Member States and 
Section 3.5.4 groups countries according to their 
overall and underlying progress.
3.5.1 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LISBON 
STRATEGY IN 2006 AND 2000 
The beneﬁ   t of the doubt composite indicator 
scores based on the level of the economic 
indicators in 2006 and the country-speciﬁ  c 
weights are provided in Table 2. The ﬁ  rst column 
of Table 2 shows the composite indicator score 
for the level of the eight economic structural 
indicators in 2006, with equal weighting. The 
ranking resulting from the beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
analysis, reported in the second column, shows 
six countries with a composite indicator score of 
1 and the rest with scores lower than 1.
As regards the countries with scores lower 
than 1, the interpretation of the scores is 
straightforward. Given the maximum and 
minimum weight restrictions, the set of weights 
in the table provides the country with its optimal 
composite indicator score. The set of weights 
therefore provides information about the areas 
Annex 1 provides a short description of the different steps of the  22 
ranking procedure and a short presentation of the ﬁ  ndings.27
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in which a country performs relatively well 
(high weights) and less well (low weights). 
A lower score indicates a greater distance from 
the best-performing country under the chosen 
set of weights. In addition, the number of 
countries that achieve a better performance than 
each individual country under the chosen set of 
weights is also listed in the table. 
With regard to the countries with a composite 
indicator score of 1, the interpretation of the 
scores is less straightforward. A composite 
indicator score of 1 means that there is at least 
one set of weights with which the country 
has the highest weighted performance on the 
component indicators. Possibly, there are more 
sets of weights for which the country has the 
highest weighted performance on the component 
indicators (which also result in a composite 
indicator score of 1). 
To differentiate among the countries with a 
composite indicator score of 1, we perform 
a simulation exercise by generating 100,000 
random sets of weights for the same data and 
under the same weight constraints. The results of 
this exercise are used to compute in how many 
instances a country has a composite indicator 
score of either 1 or at least higher than 0.9 
(see Table 2, last two columns). In this simulation, 
the result differs greatly, with only one country 
(Sweden) scoring 1 for more than 50% of the 
sets of weights generated by the simulation, 
and the others only for a minority of the sets of 
weights. These results provide an understanding 
of the sensitivity to the weights given to the 
best-scoring countries. A country that scores 1 
in only a few instances (e.g. Spain or Estonia) 
is more dependent on a particular set of weights, 
and its score is dependent on a good performance 
for a smaller number of indicators than the 
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lv    0.703 0.967 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30  3 0.00%  0.62% 
be    0.872 0.964 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.28  3 0.00%  15.75% 
uk    0.889 0.962 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.29 0.11  5 0.00%  22.04% 
si    0.773 0.951 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.29  6 0.00%  0.43% 
fr    0.879 0.943 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.15  6 0.00%  16.14% 
gr    0.804 0.926 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.29  12 0.00%  0.38% 
cy    0.801 0.924 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.19  8 0.00%  0.40% 
cz    0.716 0.916 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.26  13 0.00%  0.00% 
sk    0.635 0.910 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.28  14 0.00%  0.00% 
it    0.801 0.902 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30  6 0.00%  0.00% 
lt    0.646 0.886 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.24  19 0.00%  0.00% 
pt    0.710 0.867 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.25  17 0.00%  0.00% 
hu    0.610 0.808 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.25  21 0.00%  0.00% 
pl    0.568 0.804 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.24  22 0.00%  0.00% 
mt    0.579 0.700 0.05 0.16 0.28 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.27  23 0.00%  0.00% 
Notes: “CI (equal weights)” is the composite index built by equally weighting the normalised structural indicators. “CI (beneﬁ  t of the 
doubt analysis)” is the composite indicator obtained by using the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis. The weights reported, numbered from 
1 to 8, are those computed for each structural indicator by using the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis. Restrictions have been put on the 
weights by limiting their range between 0.05 and 0.30. Column “# of better performing countries” reports the number of countries that 
perform better under the given weighting scheme. The columns “Relative frequency of 1 and >0.9” report the results of a simulation study 
where we computed the relative frequency of a score equal to 1 or higher than 0.9 by generating 100,000 random sets of weights.28
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countries that reach the maximum score more 
frequently. Even though the country already 
achieves the maximum composite indicator 
score with some sets of weights, its performance 
can be improved by a more balanced policy 
that gives importance to a broader number of 
structural indicators.
For comparison, the same composite indicator is 
computed based on the average level of the eight 
structural indicators that relate to economic 
reform in the period 1999-2001  23 (from now on 
2000 for brevity). Table 3 provides results for 
2000 and the last column shows the change in the 
level of the composite indicator between 2000 
and 2006, our measure of overall progress.
A comparison of the composite indicator scores 
in 2000 and 2006 shows that overall progress in 
the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of the Lisbon Strategy was 
mixed. The change in the composite indicator 
between 2000 and 2006 (last column of Table 3) 
shows that nine countries have improved and 
the rest remained unchanged or experienced a 
decrease. The countries that experienced an 
increase greater than 0.03 in the composite 
indicator are Latvia (+ 0.10), Estonia (+ 0.09), 
Lithuania (+ 0.07), Spain (+ 0.06) and Greece 
(+ 0.05). The countries experiencing a decrease 
greater than or equal to 0.03 are Hungary (-0.03), 
Slovakia (-0.03), Malta (-0.06), Poland (-0.06), 
Czech Republic (-0.07) and Portugal (-0.11).24
As the maximum level of all but two of the 
indicators increased between 2000 and 2006, an 
The time span chosen should help to attenuate the impact of one- 23 
off results.
The measure of overall progress depends on: (i) the change in the  24 
underlying structural indicators; and (ii) the difference between the 
weights that are used in the 2000 and 2006 composite indicators. 
In order to disentangle (i) and (ii), we looked at the change in the 
composite indicator between 2000 and 2006 by keeping the 2000 
weights constant (see Annex A2.9). The ranking of countries based 
on the change in the composite indicator is only marginally affected. 
The magnitude of the change tends to be smaller, since when 
holding the weights constant, countries are valued less favourably.  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1  0.9 
se 1.000  1.000    -------- 0   54.20% 90.04%  0.00 
lu 0.986  1.000  -------- 0   44.04% 82.89%  0.00 
at 0.935  1.000  -------- 0   1.61% 57.80%  0.00 
nl 0.927  1.000  -------- 0   0.30% 50.80%  0.00 
dk 0.899  1.000  -------- 0   0.00% 27.19%  -0.01 
de  0.911  0.984  0.05 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.28 0.13  4  0.00% 35.38%  0.00 
cz  0.714  0.984  0.05 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.30  2  0.00%  0.20%  -0.07 
pt  0.758  0.980  0.05 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.30  3  0.00%  0.43%  -0.11 
ie  0.891  0.978  0.07 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.26  3  0.00% 24.09%  0.02 
ﬁ     0.922  0.974  0.06 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.25  4  0.00% 49.80%  0.00 
be  0.895  0.967  0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.28 0.18  3  0.00% 27.88%  0.00 
si  0.762  0.958  0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30  2  0.00%  0.28%  -0.01 
fr  0.881  0.958  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.12 0.30 0.05  7  0.00% 13.77%  -0.02 
sk  0.617  0.945  0.05 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30  7  0.00%  0.00%  -0.03 
es  0.791  0.944  0.05 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.30  8  0.00%  0.15%  0.06 
uk  0.883  0.944  0.08 0.10 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.22  8  0.00% 11.72%  0.02 
it  0.817  0.928  0.05 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.25  6  0.00%  0.22%  -0.03 
ee  0.674  0.913  0.05 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.30  13  0.00%  0.00%  0.09 
cy  0.775  0.911  0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.24 0.11  10  0.00%  0.01%  0.01 
gr  0.769  0.873  0.05 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.21  15  0.00%  0.00%  0.05 
pl  0.623  0.864  0.05 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30  18  0.00%  0.00%  -0.06 
lv  0.611  0.863  0.05 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.30  19  0.00%  0.00%  0.10 
hu  0.601  0.841  0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30  19  0.00%  0.00%  -0.03 
lt  0.597  0.817  0.05 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.28  23  0.00%  0.00%  0.07 
mt  0.615  0.759  0.05 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.30  22  0.00%  0.00%  -0.06 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The last column reports the difference between the composite indicators in 2006 and 2000.29
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increase in the composite indicator score in almost 
all cases signiﬁ  es an improvement in the position 
of the Member State, rather than a deterioration of 
the performance of the best-performing country. 
However, the maximum scores fell between 2000 
and 2006 for two indicators: indicators 5 (youth 
educational attainment) and 6 (gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D). Countries that assign a high 
weight to these indicators derive any improvement 
to some extent from a deterioration of the best-
performing country. It is notable that Poland and 
Hungary, among the worst performers in 2000 
and 2006, both have a weight of 30% on indicator 
5 in 2006 and 2000. In other words, the indicators 
for which the maximum level fell – rather than 
the indicators for which the maximum level rose 
or remained constant – heavily contributed to 
their results.
3.5.2 OVERALL PROGRESS OF MEMBER STATES 
COMPARED WITH THE STARTING LEVEL 
IN 2000
To be able to take into account differences in 
starting levels among Member States when 
assessing the overall progress made with the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, Chart 1 
Part B contains the beneﬁ  t of the doubt composite 
indicators computed for the level of the economic 
indicators in 2000 (y axis) and our overall progress 
measure, the change in the composite indicator 
scores between 2000 and 2006 (x axis).25 The 
ﬁ  gure is divided into four quadrants by two lines 
through the median scores of both, to facilitate the 
comparison of the performance of the Member 
States. As can be seen from Chart 1 Part A: 
•  countries in quadrant I combine a high 
starting level in 2000 with slow overall 
progress up to 2006;
•  those in quadrant II had a low starting level 
and made slow overall progress;
•  the countries in quadrant III started at a 
low level in 2000, but made good overall 
progress; and
•  quadrant IV countries had a high starting 
level and made good overall progress. 
As Chart 1 Part B shows, in general, the 
progress made by countries over the period 
2000-2006 is very mixed and not necessarily 
linked to the starting level. The countries 
making most progress, i.e. the Baltic States, 
Spain and Greece, have below-median 
composite indicator scores for the level 
in 2000. However, there are large differences 
with regard to the change among countries with 
similar starting levels. For example, Latvia and 
Poland have comparable composite indicator 
scores for the level in 2000, but Latvia has 
the highest positive change in the composite 
indicator over the past ﬁ  ve years and Poland the 
third greatest deterioration. Likewise, there is a 
For comparison, the same ﬁ   gure, but on the basis of equal  25 
weighting, is included in Annex A2.8. The position of most 
countries – although certainly not all – is roughly similar under 
both weighting schemes.
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Note: Beneﬁ  t of the doubt composite indicator for the level of 
structural indicators in 2000 (y axis) and its change (overall 
progress) between 2000 and 2006 (x axis).30
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signiﬁ  cant difference in the composite indicator 
scores for the change among the countries that 
started with a high level (composite indicator 
above or equal to 0.95), for example Portugal 
and Ireland. The ranking presented in this 
way provides information on the relative 
progress made by a country compared with 
all EU Member States as well as compared 
with its peer group of countries with a similar 
starting level.
Against this background, catching-up effects 
show up in the ranking, but do not fully 
drive the results. The starting level of some 
countries which would generally be considered 
to be catching-up countries, such as the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, is higher than 
that of countries that have been EU Member 
States for much longer, such as Italy or the UK. 
This starting position can be attributed to the 
use of a wider variety of indicators than only 
those directly associated with catching-up, such 
as GDP per head. Also, the use of PPP in the 
measurement of indicators incorporates catching-
up effects to a certain extent. The differences in 
progress made by various catching-up countries 
point to the difﬁ  culty of realising catching-up 
potential: most of the best-performing countries 
are catching-up countries, but so are the worst-
performing countries.
3.5.3 UNDERLYING PROGRESS OF MEMBER STATES 
IN ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE LISBON 
STRATEGY
Any increases in the composite indicator score 
reﬂ  ect a relative improvement in the position 
of the Member States, and should therefore be 
interpreted positively, just as a decrease should 
be interpreted negatively. The table and ﬁ  gures 
presented above should be considered as a 
measure of the performance of the Member 
States in relation to each other. 
However, additional important information can 
be derived from analysing composite indicator 
scores based on the change in the economic 
indicators, in addition to the change in the level 
of the composite indicator (which we used above 
to measure overall progress). A similar change in 
the structural indicators of two countries can be 
reﬂ  ected differently in the composite indicator 
score, depending on the weights selected by the 
beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis. 
An example is the easiest way to clarify 
the difference. Take a country in which the 
employment rate (indicator 3) increased as 
much as its employment rate of older workers 
(indicator 4) decreased between 2000 and 
2006, relative to the maximum score. If both 
indicators receive the same weight under the 
beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis, there is no effect 
on the composite indicator score in 2006. 
If the country started with a relatively low 
employment rate in 2000 and a relatively high 
employment rate of older workers, resulting in a 
low weight for indicator 3 and a high weight for 
indicator 4 respectively, the negative inﬂ  uence 
of the decrease in the employment rate of 
older workers on the composite indicator score 
outweighs the positive inﬂ  uence of the increase 
of the employment rate, resulting in a negative 
net effect on the composite indicator score. 
Conversely, a high weight for an indicator that 
increases and a low weight for a decreasing 
indicator would result in a positive net effect. 
If the downward change in the indicators with 
the low weight in 2000 would result in an 
even lower weight in 2006, the net positive 
effect on the composite indicator would be 
even stronger. Complementing the analysis of 
(the change in) the composite indicator scores 
based on the level of the structural indicators 
with an analysis of the change in the structural 
indicators can therefore show progress made 
by the Member State (or the lack thereof) on 
individual indicators, which might otherwise 
be overlooked. To measure the progress by 
Member States which may be concealed by the 
weighting method used for measuring overall 
progress, we compute a composite indicator 
for the change in the structural indicators. This 
allows us to gauge the “underlying progress” 
made by Member States. 31
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Table 4 presents the composite indicator for 
the change in the structural indicators between 
2000 and 2006, with the weights calculated 
with the beneﬁ   t of the doubt analysis. The 
composite indicator of the change in the 
structural indicators over the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of 
the Lisbon Strategy shows the Member States 
again from their best angle, but this time with 
country-speciﬁ   c weights determined in 
accordance with the increases recorded in the 
different indicators. The composite indicator 
thus assigns the greatest weights to those 
indicators where the country concerned has 
recorded the strongest increases over the years. 
For comparison, the composite indicator based 
on equal weights is again included.
For indicators 1 (GDP per capita) and 2 (labour 
productivity), the change is calculated as the 
rate of growth. For indicator 7 (comparative 
price level), the change has been computed as 
the absolute distance from the EU price level 
in 2000 minus the absolute distance in 2006, so 
that increases can be interpreted as convergence 
to the EU price level. For the other indicators, 
change is calculated as the difference between 
the levels in 2006 and 2000, as there is no clear 
connection between the percentage change and 
the starting level. 
Compared with the composite indicator scores 
for the level, the scores for the change are 
more dispersed. Only two countries have a 
score of 1, compared with six for the level in 
2006. The countries with a score of less than 
1 have a more skewed weight distribution, 
with almost all minimum weights for indicator 
8 (business investment) and more maximum 
weights assigned to the other indicators. The 
average lower composite indicator scores 
imply a greater distance to the best-performing 
country than for the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis 
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12345678 1 0 . 9
lv 1.000 1.000 --------053.40% 99.22%
ee 0.993 1.000  - -------046.88% 95.33%
lt 0.829 0.993 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.05 1 0.00% 3.21%
sk 0.605 0.925 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 2 0.00% 0.00%
es 0.705 0.911 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.30 0.07 2 0.00% 0.00%
cz 0.606 0.852 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.05 3 0.00% 0.00%
mt 0.491 0.848 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.05 3 0.00% 0.00%
hu 0.610 0.844 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 4 0.00% 0.00%
lu 0.504 0.831 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 3 0.00% 0.00%
at 0.552 0.779 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.30 0.18 0.05 5 0.00% 0.00%
gr 0.630 0.758 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.19 0.05 4 0.00% 0.00%
ie 0.625 0.733 0.28 0.23 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.05 4 0.00% 0.00%
si 0.625 0.705 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.05 7 0.00% 0.00%
cy 0.581 0.689 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.05 8 0.00% 0.00%
ﬁ  0.524  0.677  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.15 0.05 7 0.00% 0.00%
pt 0.378 0.669 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 10 0.00% 0.00%
uk 0.474 0.665 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.30 0.05 9 0.00% 0.00%
pl 0.375 0.664 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 11 0.00% 0.00%
it 0.449 0.663 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.05 4 0.00% 0.00%
se 0.440 0.633 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.30 0.05 14 0.00% 0.00%
de 0.436 0.623 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.15 0.30 0.05 10 0.00% 0.00%
dk 0.450 0.576 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.05 12 0.00% 0.00%
nl 0.407 0.533 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 12 0.00% 0.00%
fr 0.452 0.526 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 18 0.00% 0.00%
be 0.377 0.476 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 21 0.00% 0.00%
Note: See notes to Table 2.32
ECB
Occasional Paper No 85
June 2008
carried out on the level of structural indicators 
(Tables 2 and 3).
Chart 2 plots the composite indicator computed 
for the level of structural indicators in 2000 
(y axis) and our measure of underlying progress 
between 2000 and 2006 (x axis). The results 
show that the countries with the highest 
composite indicator score for the change in the 
structural indicators (underlying progress) are 
generally the ones with lower starting levels. 
Nevertheless, the differing performance across 
countries shown in Chart 2 shows that other 
factors are also at play, such as policy efforts 
or cyclical factors. Indeed, some countries 
with a low starting level (e.g. Poland) have 
made relatively poor underlying progress. 
Conversely, some countries with a high starting 
level (e.g. Luxembourg) have made good 
underlying progress.
3.5.4 GROUPING MEMBER STATES ACCORDING TO 
OVERALL AND UNDERLYING PROGRESS 
Having plotted independently the starting level 
of each country against its “overall progress” 
and “underlying progress”, we now move on 
to consider the relationship between our two 
measures of progress. Chart 3 Part B plots the 
composite indicators computed for the change 
in structural indicators between 2000 and 2006 
(y axis), i.e. our measure of underlying progress, 
and the change in the composite indicator for the 
level of the structural indicators between 2000 
and 2006 (x axis), i.e. our measure of overall 
progress. In this ﬁ   gure, the median scores of 
both measures are again used to divide the 
Member States into four groups, as illustrated in 
Chart 3 Part A.
Quadrant IV contains the countries that 
combine underlying progress with overall 
progress, i.e. the three Baltic countries and 
Spain. Their mirror image is to be found in the 
bottom-left corner of quadrant II, which groups 
countries with a poor record on both overall 
progress and underlying progress. Portugal, 
Poland and Italy combine the greatest fall 
Chart 2 Composite indicators (benefit of the doubt analysis) 
computed for the level of structural indicators in 2000 (y axis) and 
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Chart 3 Measuring performance using overall 
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Note: Composite indicators computed for the change in structural 
indicators between 2000 and 2006 (y-axis) and change in the 
composite indicator computed for the level of structural indicators 
between 2000 and 2006 (x-axis).33
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in the composite indicator score for the level 
with poor underlying progress, while France 
and Belgium combine the lowest underlying 
progress with a below-median overall 
progress. 
Quadrant I contains countries that combine 
high underlying progress with poor overall 
progress, which means that they improved in 
indicators on which they have not done well 
so far (and are therefore weighted low in their 
country-speciﬁ  c set of weights). An example is 
Slovakia which has a high composite indicator 
computed for the change in the structural 
indicators, which indicates that the country is 
making good underlying progress. However, 
the composite indicator for Slovakia computed 
for the levels of structural indicators decreased 
between 2000 and 2006. The weights in Table 4 
show that the indicators in which Slovakia 
performs well in terms of change (i.e. those 
with larger weights, namely employment of 
older workers and comparative price level) 
are not those that receive larger weights in the 
composite indicator for the levels in 2000 and 
2006 (youth educational attainment and business 
investment). In other words, Slovakia performed 
well on indicators where it did not score very 
well in the past.   
Quadrant III includes countries which 
combine a low underlying progress with an 
improvement in overall progress, by making 
improvements mainly on indicators on which 
they do well already (and which are therefore 
given a high weight in the beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
analysis). For example, Germany experienced a 
relatively strong increase in indicators 4 and 7 
between 2000 and 2006 and this is reﬂ  ected 
in the high weights of these dimensions in the 
composite indicator computed for the change 
in the structural indicators (underlying progress 
measure). These dimensions already received 
high weights also in the composite indicators 
computed for the level of the structural 
indicators in 2000 and 2006, which meant the 
change had a large effect on the change in the 
composite indicator score of Germany.
To assess the position of the Member States 
in the ranking, the overall progress dimension 
should be emphasised over the underlying 
progress dimension. The overall progress made 
by a country is negative when it falls behind 
on more indicators than it improves and/or 
the loss in the falling indicators outweighs the 
gains in the rising ones. However, if a country 
combines a negative overall progress score with 
a high underlying progress score, its overall 
progress score can be expected to improve in 
the future as the indicator(s) on which it does 
well will receive more weight in the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt analysis. From that perspective, 
Germany could be encouraged to strengthen its 
favourable performance by making a broader 
effort. Sweden has a low underlying progress 
score, which means that its maximum score for 
the composite indicator of the level could in 
the future be in jeopardy. Slovakia on the other 
hand should be encouraged to continue on its 
current path, as this will soon also be reﬂ  ected 
in its level scores. 
Furthermore, combining both progress measures 
with the composite indicator level in 2000 
(Charts 1 Part B and 2 respectively) facilitates 
the assessment of the performance of countries 
along both dimensions. For example, the ﬁ  rst 
ﬁ  gure shows that the UK’s overall progress was 
good, although from a low starting level. The 
second ﬁ  gure shows that the UK scored only a 
below-median score for underlying progress, 
lower than the countries with comparable 
starting levels, such as Spain and Slovakia.
3.6  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS
To assess the robustness of the composite 
indicators for the level of and change in 
the economic structural indicators and their 
sensitivity to different speciﬁ  cations, a number 
of alternative versions are summarised below 
(see Annex 2 for more detail).
(i) To assess the possible inﬂ  uence of outliers, 
the composite indicator of the level in 2000 and 
2006 has been compared with the composite 34
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indicator scores for the same period, excluding 
Luxembourg from the sample. This does 
not have a signiﬁ   cant impact on the results 
(see Table 8 in Annex 2).
(ii) The weight restrictions used in the calculation 
of the composite indicator result in the occurrence 
of more minimum than maximum weights. 
In the composite indicator for the level of the 
economic indicators (2006 as well as 2000), one 
indicator receives the maximum weight among 
approximately half of the Member States with 
a composite indicator score of less than 1, and 
two countries have two maximum weights for 
two indicators. In contrast, all countries with a 
composite indicator score of less than 1 have at 
least one minimum score, and eight countries have 
a minimum score for four out of eight indicators. 
The weight restrictions result in considerably 
more minimum and maximum weights in the 
computation of the composite indicator scores for 
the change in economic indicators, which reﬂ  ects 
the more dispersed scores for the change in the 
indicators. Half of the Member States are not 
constrained by the weight restrictions for only 
one indicator. 
To assess the inﬂ  uence of the weight restrictions 
on the order of the scores, the composite indicators 
have been calculated with minimal weight 
restrictions such that weights cannot be negative 
and all weights sum up to 100%, and a minimum 
weight restriction of 5% for each indicator (see 
Tables 9, 10, 14 and 17 in Annex 2). By deﬁ  nition, 
the introduction of weight restrictions reduces the 
possibility to obtain a high composite indicator 
score, resulting in lower or equal scores with the 
introduction of more binding weight restrictions. 
It is notable that the composite indicator scores 
under minimum weight restrictions are close to 
those under minimum and maximum weight 
restrictions for most countries. The ranking is 
mostly unaffected, the exceptions being countries 
which obtain a higher composite indicator under 
the minimum weight restrictions only, due to 
highly skewed weights. 
(iii) Some indicators are disaggregated by 
gender. Since considering genders separately 
would increase the weight of a dimension 
in the composite indicator, we decided to 
aggregate the indicators by gender along 
dimensions. To assess whether a different 
method of incorporating gender differentiation 
would inﬂ   uence the results, we compared 
the composite indicator scores with equal 
weights for both genders with the possibility 
of differentiated weights, based on the 
beneﬁ   t of the doubt analysis. This does not 
have a signiﬁ   cant impact on the ranking 
(see Tables 11, 12, 15 and 18 in Annex 2).
(iv) To assess the robustness of the ranking to 
indicator 7 (comparative price level), which is 
the indicator that is most difﬁ  cult to interpret 
from an economic perspective, we compared the 
indicator scores with those calculated without 
indicator 7 (see Tables 13, 16 and 19 in Annex 2).
As expected, our recalculation of the indicator 
as the distance to the EU average price level is 
favourable to large Member States, since they 
have a greater inﬂ  uence on the average price 
level than small Member States. Accordingly, 
the exclusion of this indicator lowers the 
composite indicator scores of the large EU 
countries for the level in 2000 and 2006. Our 
analysis suggests that, should a revision of the 
structural indicators be undertaken, this indicator 
might be reconsidered. 
(v) It should be recalled that the analysis is 
limited to the period 2000-2006. It could be 
argued that this period is too short for a complete 
view of the success of the Lisbon Strategy, as 
the impact of some structural reforms may take 
quite some time to ﬁ  lter through. To check the 
accuracy of these claims, it would be necessary 
to repeat this exercise with data over a longer 
time period. This could be an avenue for 
future research. 
4 CONCLUSION
The pursuit of structural reforms – which is 
already difﬁ   cult within a national political 
context – is, in the European Union, further 
complicated by the fact that the Member States 35
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4   CONCLUSION
are invited to consider their own reform priorities 
within a process of deepening integration. 
From that perspective, the decision of the EU 
Heads of State or Government in March 2000 
to embark upon a shared blueprint of reforms, 
called the Lisbon Strategy, was ambitious yet 
also absolutely necessary. In the past eight 
years, progress has been made in setting up 
an appropriate governance framework for 
coordinating the economic policies of Member 
States in a framework of deepening integration. 
However, given the mixed progress made in the 
ﬁ  rst half of the decade, further adjustment of 
the governance framework might be required, 
especially in view of the importance of the 
Lisbon objectives for the European economies 
and the functioning of Monetary Union. 
The attempt to increase national ownership of 
the Lisbon Strategy during the 2005 mid-term 
review was therefore a positive step. However, 
this step was not matched with stronger 
benchmarking. Greater national ownership of 
the Lisbon Strategy should not be equated with 
the absence of commitment at the EU level, 
but is an argument for stronger benchmarking 
of the implementation of the objectives set by 
national governments. Indeed, benchmarking 
– including its strong variant of ranking – is a 
crucial tool for closing the implementation gap 
at the national level.
The ranking method presented in this paper is a 
way to summarise the performance of Member 
States in a composite indicator, thus drawing 
direct attention to the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy and increasing peer pressure. 
By incorporating both the level and the change 
of the component indicators and by using 
country-speciﬁ   c weights, the methodology 
addresses the most frequent criticisms of 
ranking. The ranking methodology of this paper 
is put forward as a way of improving the conduct 
of benchmarking at the EU level. It should 
therefore be seen as one possible component 
in the wider multilateral surveillance process 
that is foreseen in the EC Treaty and that takes 
place annually at the EU level in order to assess 
progress with the National Reform Programmes 
of Member States and the Lisbon Strategy.
With the methodology proposed in this paper, 
it is possible to construct a composite indicator 
that: (i) summarises in one number a multitude 
of indicators and identiﬁ   es where countries 
stand in the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy; and (ii) identiﬁ  es the progress made by 
countries taking into account differences in the 
starting level. On the basis of this approach we 
are able to identify top and bottom performers. 
Furthermore, robustness checks show that the 
method is robust.
Some controversy is an unavoidable aspect 
of any ranking or league table, and such 
controversy is likely to also focus the debate 
and provide the pressure to pursue reforms. In 
this respect, the scepticism of some observers 
about ranking can be interpreted as a sign that it 
could actually work – a league table that nobody 
is afraid of would not be effective. At the same 
time, too much controversy may undermine the 
credibility of the ranking. A Lisbon ranking 
should be considered as the starting-point 
for a debate on the performance of the EU 
Member States, not the ﬁ  nal word, and should 
be presented within a broader assessment, 
including ranking and benchmarking on the 
basis of individual indicators, as well as 
qualitative assessment.
As a ﬁ   rst step, the ranking methodology 
presented in this paper could be used to measure 
the economic progress made by the Member 
States, on the basis of the eight structural 
economic indicators that have been adopted by 
the EU Council. The ranking methodology could 
be used by the Council and the Commission in 
the surveillance framework under Articles 99 
and 128 of the Treaty. More speciﬁ  cally, the 
Commission could potentially consider using 
such an approach in its Annual Progress Report, 
which is appropriately accompanied by more 
qualitative assessments of the progress made by 
the Member States.36
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The ranking methodology could potentially be 
extended to all 14 structural indicators, which 
have legitimacy through their adoption by 
the Council. A condition for this would be an 
improvement of their quality and availability 
or a revision of the structural indicators in the 
future. Alternatively, the methodology could 
also be applied to a longer list of economic 
indicators, such as the one drawn up by the 
Economic Policy Committee of the EU in 
2006, in an effort to bring the assessment of 
structural reforms closer to the implementation 
of the Integrated Guidelines. However, making 
ranking conditional on the existence of an 
undisputed set of structural indicators would 
mean indeﬁ  nite postponement of one of the few 
means of improving the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy whilst remaining within the 
boundaries of soft coordination.37
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METHODOLOGY OF THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT 
RANKING
The ranking presented in Section 3 is based 
on a weighted average of the 8 of the 14 
structural indicators adopted by the EU Council 
in December 2003, relating to economic 
performance and reform. The ranking gives 
information on the performance of the 
25 EU Member States (excluding Bulgaria and 
Romania) relative to each other regarding the 
starting level at the beginning of the Lisbon 
Strategy and the progress made in the following 
ﬁ   ve years. The process by which we arrive 
at the ranking is summarised in a ﬂ  owchart, 
and the methodology is set out in more 
detail below.
1. Assessing the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy
Where do we stand in 2006 and where did we stand at the beginning of the Lisbon Strategy?
Normalisation of the structural indicators (between 0 and 1), determination of the weights with the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis, and 
computation of the composite indicator.
Where do we stand?  Composite indicator in 2006 (Chart 4)
Where did we stand at the start of the Lisbon Strategy?  Composite indicator average for the period 1999-2001 (Chart 4)
2. Assessing the performance of Member States in the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy
2A. Overall progress of Member States
Difference between the composite indicator in 2006 and the composite indicator average for the period 1999-2001 (overall progress)
Overall progress of Member States conditional on their starting level in 2000 (Chart 5)
Member States may have a low overall progress measure because they make progress mostly in dimensions in which they are relatively 
weak. As a consequence these dimensions have low weights in the composite indicator and any progress in these dimensions is less 
than proportionally reﬂ  ected in the change of the composite indicator. But which countries saw a relative improvement in the structural 
indicators? 
2B. Underlying progress of Member States
Computation of the change in the structural indicators, normalisation of the change in the structural indicators (between 0 and 1), 
determination of the weights with the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis, and computation of the composite indicator for the change in the 
structural indicators.
Evaluation of the underlying progress made by Member States in combination with the overall progress achieved in the period 
2000-2006 (Chart 6).42
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Chart 4 Assessing the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy
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Note: Ranking according to the level and the frequency of 1 in the simulation exercise in 2006 (see Table 2).
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Note: Beneﬁ  t of the doubt composite indicator for the level of 
structural indicators in 2000 (y axis) and its change (overall 
progress) between 2000 and 2006 (x axis).
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A2.1 DATA  SELECTION
The ranking is based on the structural indicators 
adopted by the EU Council of Ministers to 
measure progress on the Lisbon Strategy. The 
source of the data is Eurostat.
In case of missing observations, data for the 
nearest available year have been used. 
Analysis of the 2006 data: Regarding indicator 
6 (gross domestic expenditure on R&D), 2005 
data have been used for Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and the UK.
Analysis of the average of the indicators in 
the period 1999-2001 (referred to in the main 
text as 2000): Malta and Cyprus have no data 
for 1999 for indicator 3 (employment rate) and 
indicator 4 (employment rate of old workers). 
Malta has no data for 1999 for indicator 5 (youth 
educational attainment). Regarding indicator 
6 (gross domestic expenditure on R&D), 2002 
data have been used for Malta, while data for 
Luxembourg are missing for 1999 and 2001, 
and data for Greece and Sweden are missing 
for 2000.
The same data used in the analysis for 2000 and 
2006 have been used to compute the change 
between 2000 and 2006. 
With regard to the possibility of correlations 
referred to in Section 3.2, the matrices below 
show the correlations among the levels of and 
changes in the eight economic indicators. 
Table 5 Correlation among the levels of the economic structural indicators
12345678
1 1.00 - - - - - - -
2 0.90 1.00 - - - - - -
3 -0.33 -0.18 1.00 - - - - -
4 -0.33 -0.06 0.87 1.00 - - - -
5 -0.35 -0.13 0.05 0.39 1.00 - - -
6 -0.69 -0.34 0.50 0.74 0.57 1.00 - -
7 0.07 -0.30 -0.48 -0.64 -0.53 -0.63 1.00 -
8 0.60 0.36 -0.27 -0.44 -0.55 -0.76 0.31 1.00
Notes: The table displays the correlation among the structural economic indicators over the period 1999-2006 for the EU25 countries. 
If gender differentiation is available, the indicator has been averaged across both gender dimensions.
Table 6 Correlation among the changes in the changes in the economic structural indicators
12345678
1 1.00 - - - - - - -
2 0.88 1.00 - - - - - -
3 0.07 0.04 1.00 - - - - -
4 0.08 0.07 0.96 1.00 - - - -
5 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 1.00 - - -
6 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.14 1.00 - -
7 -0.29 -0.24 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.24 1.00 -
8 0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.15 0.18 1.00
Notes: The table displays the correlation among the changes in the structural economic indicators over the period 1999-2006 for the EU25 
countries. If gender differentiation is available, the indicator has been averaged across both gender dimensions.44
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A2.2  NORMALISATION OF THE DATA
The structural indicators are rescaled by dividing 
each country’s score by the score of the best-
performing country (i.e. the country with the 
best score in that dimension). The normalised 
indicators range between 0 and 1.  26 The same 
procedure is adopted to normalise the level of 
and the change in the structural indicators.
Indicator 7 (comparative price level) is 
recalculated as the absolute difference to the EU 
average. Furthermore, as indicator 7 is the only 
one for which the lower the score the better, 
after the usual normalisation, the scale of the 
indicator is inverted by subtracting it from one 
and once again normalised between 0 and 1 by 
dividing by the maximum score.
Table 7 shows the maximum level of each 
indicator for the average of 1999-2001, which 
is used in the analysis as the starting level, and 
for 2006.
This method of normalisation provides 
comparable indicators that contain information 
on the performance of Member States relative to 
each other, and on the magnitude of the 
performance differences. Since the normalisation 
method is dependent on the differences between 
the country scores, it is potentially sensitive to 
outliers.27 A check of the data showed that with 
regard to the level of the structural indicators, the 
high scores of Luxembourg on indicator 1 (GDP 
per capita) and indicator 2 (labour productivity) 
could be regarded as outliers. In order to check 
the sensitivity of the results, we calculated the 
composite indicator without Luxembourg 
(see Table 8). Overall, there are no signiﬁ  cant 
changes in the ﬁ   nal ranking after 
dropping Luxembourg.
The normalised indicator assumes a value of 0 only if the score  26 
of a country in the indicator is 0. Therefore, while the maximum 
value of the normalised indicator is always 1, the minimum value 
of the normalised indicators is not always 0.
A normalisation achieved through ranking would not be  27 
sensitive to outliers, but would instead ignore the magnitude of 
cross-country differences. 
Table 7 Maximum level of the structural economic indicators in the period 1999-2001 and in 
2006 1)
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1999-2001 239.33 171.40 76.08 65.22 94.20 3.93 57.23 25.03
2006 279.60 183.90 77.30 69.60 91.75 3.82 43.40 29.80
1) When differentiation between genders is available, the indicator is averaged across genders.
Table 8   Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, excluding Luxembourg
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
at 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
be 9 0.977 0.964 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.21
cy 16 0.917 0.924 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.20 0.17
cz 17 0.904 0.916 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.25
de 7 0.990 0.989 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.05 0.06 0.29 0.15
dk 8 0.981 0.992 0.12 0.05 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.29
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
es 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
ﬁ  10 0.973 0.973 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.30
fr 14 0.946 0.943 0.08 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.12
gr 15 0.921 0.926 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.23
hu 22 0.799 0.808 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.23
ie 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
it 19 0.901 0.902 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.3045
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ANNEXES
A2.3  WEIGHT DETERMINATION WITH BENEFIT OF 
THE DOUBT ANALYSIS
Setting weights for each country with the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt analysis involves ﬁ  nding  the 
weights that maximise the composite indicator 
deﬁ  ned in Section 3.4.1.
Restrictions on the maximal or minimal weights 
prevent too much weight being assigned to 
a single indicator and too little to the other 
indicators. However, restricting the weights 
assigned to a single indicator reduces the 
possibilities for a country to reach the highest 
composite indicator score (1). A comparison of the 
composite indicator scores with different weight 
restrictions provides insight into the inﬂ  uence of 
weight restrictions.
Imposing minimal weight restrictions 
results in ten countries achieving the highest 
composite indicator score for the 2006 data 
(see Table 9), considerably more than for 
the benchmark speciﬁ   cation reported in 
Table 9 Ranking based on the level of the structural economic indicators in 2006, with 
minimal weight restrictions 
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and cannot be negative)
Country Rank CI 




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
at 1  1.000  1.000  - - - - ----
be  14  0.987  0.964  0.01 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.33 
cy  13  0.988  0.924  0.00 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.22 
cz  18  0.970  0.916  0.06 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.43 0.07 0.00 0.21 
de  12  0.989  0.989  0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.28 0.17 
dk 1  1.000  0.992 - - - - ----
ee 1  1.000  1.000 - - - - ----
es 1  1.000  1.000 - - - - ----
ﬁ     11  0.989  0.973  0.09 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.31 
fr  21  0.943  0.943  0.06 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.15 
gr  20  0.952  0.926  0.00 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.00 0.15 0.29 
hu  24  0.899  0.808  0.00 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.10 
ie 1  1.000  1.000  - - - - ----
it  23  0.925  0.902  0.00 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.34 
Table 8   Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, excluding Luxembourg 
(continued)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
lt 20 0.866 0.886 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.24
lu - - 1.000 - - - - ----
lv 11 0.961 0.967 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.30
mt 24 0.695 0.700 0.05 0.18 0.28 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.22
nl 6 0.992 0.999 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.10
pl 23 0.790 0.804 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.23
pt 21 0.859 0.867 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.25
se 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
si 13 0.952 0.951 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.30 0.08 0.05 0.29
sk 18 0.903 0.910 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30
uk 12 0.959 0.962 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.13
Notes: The column “Rank” reports the rank of a country under the composite indicator (CI) displayed in column “CI (beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
analysis)”. The latter is the composite indicator obtained by using the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis under the weight restrictions speciﬁ  ed 
under the title of the table. “CI (benchmark)” is the CI indicator in the benchmark speciﬁ  cation as reported in Table 2. The weights 
reported, numbered from 1 to 8 (each number corresponds to an indicator; see Table 1 in the main text), are those computed for each 
structural indicator by using the beneﬁ  t of the doubt analysis.46
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Section 3. For the countries that score less 
than 1, a weighting scheme which maximises 
their composite indicator score is identiﬁ  ed. 
The resulting weights show which indicators 
are more important for those countries 
(youth educational attainment, business 
investment and the employment rate), and on 
which indicators they score comparatively 
less well (GDP per capita, gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D and labour productivity). 
Table 9 also shows that with no minimum 
weight restrictions, the weights distribution 
is skewed for a number of countries. Many 
indicators have a zero weight, which implies 
that they are disregarded completely in the 
calculation of the composite indicator scores, 
whereas others receive a high share of the 
total weight. According to the analysis carried 
out on 2006 data, some examples of countries 
with a very concentrated weight distribution 
are Poland (82% weight for indicator 5 – 
youth educational attainment), Malta (54% for 
indicator 3 – employment rate) and Lithuania 
and Hungary (more than 50% for indicator 5 – 
youth educational attainment). 
Imposing a minimum weight restriction ensures 
that all indicators are used in the composite 
indicator (see Table 10). Without the imposition of 
a minimum weight, 10 out of 25 countries obtain 
Table 10 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, with minimum weight 
restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and must be greater than or equal to 5%)
Country Rank CI




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
at 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
be 12 0.965 0.964 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.28
cy 19 0.924 0.924 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.19
cz 16 0.949 0.916 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.05 0.21
de 9 0.989 0.989 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.28 0.17
dk 8 0.992 0.992 0.10 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.29
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
es 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
ﬁ  11 0.975 0.973 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.34
fr 17 0.943 0.943 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.15
gr 18 0.926 0.926 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.29
hu 24 0.844 0.808 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.52 0.05 0.05 0.18
ie 1 1.000 1.000 - - ------
it 21 0.904 0.902 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.32 0.34
Table 9 Ranking based on the level of the structural economic indicators in 2006, with 
minimal weight restrictions (continued)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and cannot be negative)
Country Rank CI 




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
lt  17  0.978  0.886  0.01 0.01 0.22 0.06 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.13 
lu 1  1.000  1.000  - - ------
lv 1  1.000  0.967  - - ------
mt  25  0.750  0.700  0.00 0.22 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.18 
nl 1  1.000  0.999  - - ------
pl  16  0.983  0.804  0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.05 0.00 
pt  22  0.932  0.867  0.00 0.00 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.22 
se 1  1.000  1.000 - - ------
si  19  0.959  0.951  0.01 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.07 0.07 0.30 
sk 1  1.000  0.910 - - ------
uk  15  0.983  0.962  0.07 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.17 
Note: See notes to Table 8.47
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the maximum score. After imposing a minimum 
weight of 0.05, 6 countries out of 25 get the 
maximum score of 1. For Poland and Latvia, all 
the freely assigned weight (65%) is concentrated 
within one indicator, while the minimum weight is 
assigned to the other indicators. 
A2.4  SENSITIVITY AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS: 
GENDER DIFFERENTIATION
Some of the structural indicators are 
disaggregated by gender, to account for the 
developments for males and females separately. 
In the ranking presented in Section 4.2 and 
in the tables above, those indicators are 
constructed as the unweighted average of the 
male and female indicators, which gives equal 
weight to both gender dimensions within the 
weights determined by the beneﬁ  t of the doubt 
analysis. An alternative would be to allow 
full gender differentiation, i.e. treating both 
gender dimensions as separate indicators. This 
approach results in higher combined weights 
for the indicator concerned, for example the 
weights assigned to indicator 5 (F + M) for 
Poland are higher than the maximum weight 
constraint (see Table 11). Introducing additional 
weight constraints can maximise the sum of the 
weights assigned to both gender dimensions 
of each indicator, but this results in even more 
pronounced differences in the weight assigned to 
the gender dimensions of a single indicator than 
with full gender differentiation, e.g. the weights 
assigned to indicators 5F and 5M for Slovakia 
(see Tables 11 and 12). The differentiation 
in weights is the result of a (much) better 
Table 11 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, with complete gender 
differentiation
(constraints weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI





Weight of indicator number :
1 2 3F 3M 4F 4M 5F 5M 6 7 8
at 1 1.000 1.000 - ----------
be 12 0.953 0.964 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.20
cy 14 0.950 0.924 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.13
cz 17 0.920 0.916 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.25
de 9 0.975 0.989 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.26 0.14
dk 8 0.986 0.992 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.26
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - ----------
es 1 1.000 1.000 - ----------
ﬁ  11 0.959 0.973 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.24
Table 10 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, with minimum weight 
restrictions (continued)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and must be greater than or equal to 5%)
Country Rank CI




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
lt 20 0.909 0.886 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.05 0.21
lu 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
lv 10 0.977 0.967 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.65
mt 25 0.702 0.700 0.05 0.15 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.26
nl 7 0.999 0.999 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.07
pl 22 0.888 0.804 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.05 0.05
pt 23 0.867 0.867 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.25
se 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
si 14 0.951 0.951 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.30
sk 15 0.949 0.910 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.05 0.24
uk 13 0.962 0.962 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.29 0.11
Note: See notes to Table 8.48
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Table 12 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, with gender 
differentiation and additional weight restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%. Special constraints are 
imposed when gender differentiation is available (min. 2.5% for each gender indicator and sum between the genders max. 30%)
Country Rank CI





Weight of indicator number:
1  2 3F  3M 4F  4M 5F  5M  6  7  8 
at 1 1.000  1.000 - - - - - - - - - - -
be  13 0.965  0.964  0.05 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.22 
cy  11 0.972  0.924  0.05 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.13 
cz  19 0.922  0.916  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.22 
de  9 0.975  0.989  0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.15 
dk  8 0.986  0.992  0.11 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.23 
ee 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - - - - -
es 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - - - - -
ﬁ     12 0.966  0.973  0.09 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.21 
fr  17 0.942  0.943  0.07 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.12 
gr  16 0.948  0.926  0.05 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.22 
hu  23 0.811  0.808  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.24 
ie 1 1.000  1.000 - - - - - - - - - - -
it  20 0.903  0.902  0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.23 
lt  21 0.886  0.886  0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.24 
lu 1 1.000  1.000 - - - - - - - - - - -
lv  10 0.974  0.967  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.30 
mt  25 0.767  0.700  0.05 0.12 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.19 
nl 1 1.000  0.999 - - - - - - - - - - -
pl  24 0.806  0.804  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.23 
pt  22 0.873  0.867  0.05 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.24 
se 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - - - - -
si  14 0.959  0.951  0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.26 
sk  18 0.933  0.910  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.05 0.30 
uk  15 0.959  0.962  0.09 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.12 
Notes: See notes to Table 8. When a gender differentiation is available, male and female indicators are considered as separate indicators. 
See Table 1 in the main text for the list of indicators.
Table 11 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, with complete gender 
differentiation (continued)
(constraints weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI





Weight of indicator number :
1 2 3F 3M 4F 4M 5F 5M 6 7 8
fr 16 0.937 0.943 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.12
gr 18 0.914 0.926 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.17
hu 24 0.808 0.808 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.24
ie 1 1.000 1.000 -----------
it 20 0.895 0.902 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.22
lt 21 0.890 0.886 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.24
lu 1 1.000 1.000 -----------
lv 10 0.971 0.967 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.28
mt 25 0.749 0.700 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.22
nl 7 0.992 0.999 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.10
pl 23 0.833 0.804 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.05
pt 22 0.844 0.867 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.18
se 1 1.000 1.000 -----------
si 15 0.941 0.951 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.26
sk 19 0.914 0.910 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.25
uk 13 0.951 0.962 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.11
Notes: See notes to Table 8. When a gender differentiation is available, male and female indicators are considered as separate indicators. 
See Table 1 in the main text for the list of indicators.49
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performance on one gender dimension than the 
other, which can potentially “reward” countries 
with very diverging performances in both gender 
dimensions. Unlike assigning different weights 
to different indicators, different weights for both 
gender dimensions of a single indicator can 
less easily be justiﬁ  ed by giving the beneﬁ  t of 
the doubt to previous policies. In practice, this 
approach alters the composite indicator scores 
of only a few countries and only marginally. 
A2.5  SENSITIVITY AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS: 
EXCLUDING INDICATOR 7 (COMPARATIVE 
PRICE LEVEL)
Indicator 7 (comparative price level) does not have 
a straightforward economic interpretation. As a 
measure of market integration, it is transformed 
into an indicator that measures the absolute 
distance of the price level of country j from the EU 
average. The greater the distance, the worse the 
performance of the country. However, this beneﬁ  ts 
large countries, which have greater inﬂ  uence on the 
EU average. Computing the composite indicator 
gives an indication of the size of this advantage 
for large countries. Without indicator 7, Germany, 
France, Italy, the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, 
as well as Austria, Belgium and Cyprus, have a 
lower composite indicator in 2006 (see Table 13). 
At the same time, there is a marginal increase in 
the composite indicator of those countries that 
in the benchmark speciﬁ  cation are bound by the 
minimum weight constraint, such as Latvia and the 
Czech Republic. The ranking of countries based 
on the composite indicator changes compared with 
the benchmark speciﬁ  cation, with ﬁ  ve countries 
achieving the maximum score of 1, compared with 
six under the benchmark speciﬁ  cation reported in 
Section 3. 
For the average level of the structural indicators 
for the period 1999-2001, calculating the 
composite indicators without indicator 7 has a 
similar impact (see Table 19).
Table 13 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2006, excluding indicator 7 
(comparative price level)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%.)
Country Rank CI





weight of indicator number:
1234567 8
at 8 0.968 1.000 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.09 - 0.22
be 13 0.923 0.964 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.28 0.10 - 0.24
cy 17 0.905 0.924 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.28 0.05 - 0.21
cz 11 0.932 0.916 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.08 - 0.24
de 19 0.893 0.989 0.10 0.11 0.29 0.05 0.07 0.12 - 0.27
dk 1 1.000 0.992 - - - - - - - -
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - - - - -
es 9 0.947 1.000 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.10 - 0.30
ﬁ  7 0.975 0.973 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.12 - 0.28
fr 15 0.912 0.943 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.27 0.09 - 0.25
gr 20 0.890 0.926 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.28
hu 23 0.822 0.808 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.30 0.07 - 0.24
ie 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - - - - -
it 21 0.838 0.902 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.30 0.06 - 0.21
lt 18 0.903 0.886 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.30 0.05 - 0.22
lu 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - - - - -
lv 6 0.975 0.967 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.30
mt 25 0.694 0.700 0.05 0.28 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.05 - 0.22
nl 12 0.931 0.999 0.14 0.14 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.06 - 0.19
pl 24 0.821 0.804 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.21
pt 22 0.826 0.867 0.07 0.06 0.30 0.22 0.05 0.05 - 0.26
se 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - - - - -
si 10 0.947 0.951 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.27 0.11 - 0.28
sk 14 0.922 0.910 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.26
uk 16 0.911 0.962 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.05 - 0.20
Note: See notes to Table 11.50
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A2.6  RANKING BASED ON THE LEVEL OF THE STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
(AVERAGE FOR THE PERIOD 1999-2001)
Table 15 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2000, with gender 
differentiation and additional weight restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%. Special constraints are 
imposed when gender differentiation is available (min. 2.5% for each gender indicator and sum between the genders max. 30%).
Country Rank CI (beneﬁ  t 




weight of indicator number:
1 2  3F  3M  4F  4M  5F  5M 6 7  8 
at 1 1.000 1.000 - - - ------- -
be 10 0.978 0.967 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.22 0.08
cy 15 0.962 0.911 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.05
cz 6 0.998 0.984 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.30
de 9 0.984 0.984 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.23 0.23
dk 1 1.000 1.000 - - - ------- -
ee 19 0.919 0.913 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.30
es 14 0.962 0.944 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.30
ﬁ  12 0.970 0.974 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.17
fr 13 0.963 0.958 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.25 0.08
gr 20 0.897 0.873 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.15
hu 23 0.844 0.841 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.30
ie 7 0.995 0.978 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.19
it 18 0.929 0.928 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.30 0.14
Table 14 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2000, with minimal weight 
restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and cannot be negative)
Country Rank CI





Weight of indicator number:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
at 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - -
be  10 0.993  0.967  0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.23 0.29  0.12 
cy  17 0.969  0.911  0.00 0.00 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.00 0.25  0.13 
cz 1 1.000  0.984  - - - - - - - -
de  13 0.984  0.984  0.05 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.28  0.13 
dk 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - -
ee  11 0.989  0.913  0.01 0.00 0.13 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.04  0.37 
es  14 0.981  0.944  0.01 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.12  0.42 
ﬁ     16 0.974  0.974  0.06 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.07  0.25 
fr  18 0.968  0.958  0.00 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.31  0.00 
gr  21 0.912  0.873  0.00 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.16  0.22 
hu  23 0.874  0.841  0.05 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.03  0.32 
ie 1 1.000  0.978  - - - - - - - -
it  15 0.980  0.928  0.00 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.54  0.21 
lt  24 0.872  0.817  0.02 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.00 0.01  0.28 
lu 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - -
lv  20 0.933  0.863  0.01 0.00 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.08  0.40 
mt  25 0.835  0.759  0.00 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.49 
nl 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - -
pl  22 0.891  0.864  0.00 0.01 0.17 0.10 0.33 0.00 0.08  0.32 
pt 1 1.000  0.980  - - - - - - - -
se 1 1.000  1.000  - - - - - - - -
si  12 0.985  0.958  0.00 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.28 0.04 0.07  0.38 
sk 1 1.000  0.945  - - - - - - - -
uk 19 0.944 0.944  0.08 0.10 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10  0.22 
Note: See notes to Table 8.51
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Table 16 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2000, excluding indicator 
7 (comparative price level)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI





weight of indicator number :
12345678
at 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
be 11 0.955 0.967 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.10 - 0.28
cy 23 0.857 0.911 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.26 0.05 - 0.26
cz 1 1.000 0.984 - - - - ----
de 12 0.945 0.984 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.07 - 0.30
dk 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
ee 15 0.921 0.913 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.05 - 0.30
es 17 0.905 0.944 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.05 - 0.30
ﬁ  7 0.984 0.974 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.09 - 0.30
fr 16 0.920 0.958 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.06 - 0.23
gr 19 0.873 0.873 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.05 - 0.29
hu 21 0.865 0.841 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.29 0.05 - 0.27
ie 6 0.986 0.978 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.05 - 0.30
it 22 0.857 0.928 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.05 - 0.30
lt 24 0.839 0.817 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.11 0.26 0.05 - 0.28
lu 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
lv 18 0.877 0.863 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.21 0.05 - 0.30
mt 25 0.763 0.759 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.05 - 0.30
nl 9 0.971 1.000 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.05 0.13 0.05 - 0.30
pl 20 0.867 0.864 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.28
pt 13 0.943 0.980 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.21 0.05 0.05 - 0.30
se 1 1.000 1.000 - - - - ----
si 10 0.962 0.958 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.28 0.07 - 0.28
sk 8 0.975 0.945 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.30
uk 14 0.932 0.944 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.05 - 0.26
Note: See notes to Table 8.
Table 15 Ranking based on the structural economic indicators in 2000, with gender 
differentiation and additional weight restrictions (continued)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%. Special constraints are 
imposed when gender differentiation is available (min. 2.5% for each gender indicator and sum between the genders max. 30%).
Country Rank CI (beneﬁ  t 




weight of indicator number:
1 2  3F  3M  4F  4M  5F  5M 6 7  8 
lt 25 0.819 0.817 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.24
lu 1 1.000 1.000 ---------- -
lv 21 0.877 0.863 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.30
mt 24 0.840 0.759 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.28
nl 1 1.000 1.000 ---------- -
pl 22 0.866 0.864 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.30
pt 8 0.990 0.980 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.30
se 1 1.000 1.000 ---------- -
si 11 0.973 0.958 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.30
sk 16 0.951 0.945 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.30
uk 17 0.940 0.944 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.13
Note: See notes to Table 8 and 12.52
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A2.7  CHANGE BETWEEN 2000 AND 2006
The change has been computed as a percentage 
change from the average of 1999-2001 to 2006 
for indicators 1 and 2. For indicator 7 the change 
has been computed as the absolute value of the 
distance from the average EU price level for the 
period 1999-2001 (value of the indicator - 100), 
minus the absolute distance from the EU price 
level in 2006. A positive value means that the 
price level of one country got closer to the EU 
price level. For the other indicators, the change 
has been computed as the value of the indicator 
in 2006 minus its average value in 1999-2001.
Table 18  Ranking based on the change in the structural economic indicators between 
2000 and 2006, with gender differentiation and additional weight restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%. Special constraints are 
imposed when gender differentiation is available (min. 2.5% for each gender indicator and sum between the genders max. 30%).
Country Rank CI





weight of indicator number:
1  2  3F 3M 4F 4M 5F 5M  6  7  8 
at 11 0.827 0.779 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.30 0.22 0.05
be 25 0.558 0.476 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.29 0.06
cy 14 0.752 0.689 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.03 0.06 0.36 0.08
cz 6 0.953 0.852 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.30 0.05
de 20 0.683 0.623 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.46 0.00
dk 22 0.613 0.576 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.04
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - - - --------
es 1 1.000 0.911 - - ---------
Table 17 Ranking based on the change in the structural economic indicators between 
2000 and 2006, with minimal weight restrictions
(constraints: weights must sum to 1 and cannot be negative)
Country Rank CI 




Weight of indicator number:
12345678
at 1  1.000  0.779  - - ------
be  25  0.527  0.476  0.00 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.39 0.00 0.29 0.06 
cy  20  0.759  0.689  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.23 0.36 0.08 
cz 1  1.000  0.852  - - ------
de  19  0.760  0.623  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.14 0.46 0.00 
dk  22  0.658  0.576  0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.41 0.00 0.04 
ee 1  1.000  1.000  - - ------
es 1  1.000  0.911  - - ------
ﬁ     17  0.783  0.677  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.03 0.40 0.00 
fr  24  0.577  0.526  0.00 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.44 0.00 
gr  14  0.810  0.758  0.16 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.24 0.00 
hu  10  0.974  0.844  0.04 0.10 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.13 0.40 0.00 
ie  15  0.808  0.733  0.47 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.01 
it  11  0.924  0.663  0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.04 0.10 0.02 
lt 1  1.000  0.993  - - ------
lu 1  1.000  0.831  - - ------
lv 1  1.000  1.000  - - ------
mt 1  1.000  0.848  - - ------
nl  23  0.621  0.533  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
pl  13  0.811  0.664  0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.53 0.00 
pt  12  0.873  0.669  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.43 0.00 
se  16  0.808  0.633  0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.11 
si  21  0.717  0.705  0.45 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.00 
sk 1  1.000  0.925  - - ------
uk  18  0.778  0.665  0.11 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.50 0.01 
Note: See notes to Table 8.53
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Table 19 Ranking based on the change in the structural economic indicators between 
2000 and 2006, excluding indicator 7 (comparative price level)
(Constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%)
Country Rank CI





weight of indicator number:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
at 11 0.712 0.779 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.30 - 0.05
be 25 0.455 0.476 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.30 0.05 - 0.05
cy 14 0.654 0.689 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30 - 0.20
cz 12 0.700 0.852 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.30 - 0.05
de 21 0.527 0.623 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 - 0.05
dk 18 0.589 0.576 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30 - 0.05
ee 1 1.000 1.000 - -------
es 5 0.816 0.911 0.11 0.05 0.30 0.10 0.05 0.20 - 0.18
ﬁ  16 0.647 0.677 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 - 0.05
fr 23 0.503 0.526 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.30 0.05 - 0.05
gr 9 0.741 0.758 0.26 0.30 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.05 - 0.05
hu 10 0.720 0.844 0.08 0.30 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.20 - 0.05
ie 7 0.770 0.733 0.30 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.07 - 0.05
it 15 0.653 0.663 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.20 - 0.05
lt 3 0.979 0.993 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.05
lu 4 0.842 0.831 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 - 0.05
lv 1 1.000 1.000 - -------
mt 6 0.797 0.848 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.30 - 0.05
nl 20 0.535 0.533 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.20 0.05 - 0.05
pl 17 0.605 0.664 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.05
pt 19 0.588 0.669 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.20 - 0.05
se 24 0.475 0.633 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.05 - 0.13
si 13 0.694 0.705 0.21 0.30 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.10 - 0.05
sk 8 0.744 0.925 0.27 0.30 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.05 - 0.05
uk 22 0.523 0.665 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 - 0.05
Note: See notes to Table 8.
Table 18  Ranking based on the change in the structural economic indicators between 
2000 and 2006, with gender differentiation and additional weight restrictions (continued)
(constraints: weights must sum to 1, and must be greater than or equal to 5% and less than or equal to 30%. Special constraints are 
imposed when gender differentiation is available (min. 2.5% for each gender indicator and sum between the genders max. 30%).
Country Rank CI





weight of indicator number:
1  2  3F 3M 4F 4M 5F 5M  6  7  8 
ﬁ  12 0.759 0.677 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.40 0.00
fr 24 0.585 0.526 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.44 0.00
gr 13 0.756 0.758 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.24 0.00
hu 7 0.884 0.844 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.40 0.00
ie 16 0.725 0.733 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.01
it 15 0.735 0.663 0.05 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.10 0.02
lt 5 0.982 0.993 0.22 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.05
lu 9 0.856 0.831 0.30 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
lv 1 1.000 1.000 -----------
mt 8 0.882 0.848 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.27 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.05
nl 23 0.600 0.533 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00
pl 18 0.701 0.664 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.53 0.00
pt 19 0.685 0.669 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.11 0.05 0.43 0.00
se 21 0.669 0.633 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.58 0.11
si 10 0.830 0.705 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.00
sk 1 1.000 0.925 -----------
uk 17 0.707 0.665 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.50 0.01
Note: See notes to Table 8 and 12.54
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A2.9  COMPOSITE INDICATOR IN 2006 USING THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT 2000 WEIGHTS
A2.8  RANKING WITH EQUAL WEIGHTING
Chart 7 contains the composite indicators in 2000 
and the change between 2000 and 2006, similar 
to Chart 1 Part B in Chapter 3, but on the basis 
of equal weighting. By deﬁ  nition, the composite 
indicator scores of all Member States with 
beneﬁ   t of the doubt weighting are higher than 
or equal to equal weighting, since the country-
speciﬁ  c weights enable a higher score by giving 
more weight to indicators on which the country 
performs well. With some notable exceptions, the 
order of performance is largely similar with both 
weighting schemes. The Baltic States and Spain 
made most progress from a low starting level, 
whereas the countries with the highest starting 
level made relatively less progress. The composite 
indicator changes most for countries with a very 
high weight for some indicators under the beneﬁ  t 
of the doubt weighting, such as Portugal and the 
Czech Republic. With equal weighting, they have 
a much lower starting level, but also a smaller 
subsequent change. 
Chart 7 Equal-weighting composite indicator for the 
level of the structural economic indicators in 2000 









































Table 20 Change in the composite indicator with 2000 and 2006 weights
Country CI 2000 (beneﬁ  t 
of the Doubt)
(A)












at 1.000  - - 1.000  0.000 
be  0.967  0.918 -0.049  0.964 -0.003 
cy  0.911 0.922 0.010 0.924 0.013 
cz  0.984  0.882 -0.102  0.916 -0.068 
de 0.984  0.955  -0.030  0.989  0.005 
dk 1.000  - - 0.992  -0.008 
ee  0.913 1.000 0.087 1.000 0.087 
es  0.944 1.000 0.056 1.000 0.056 
ﬁ     0.974  0.965 -0.009  0.973 -0.001 
fr  0.958  0.915 -0.043  0.943 -0.015 
gr  0.873 0.904 0.031 0.926 0.053 
hu  0.841  0.793 -0.048  0.808 -0.033 
ie  0.978 0.983 0.005 1.000 0.022 
it  0.928  0.900 -0.029  0.902 -0.026 
lt  0.817 0.861 0.045 0.886 0.069 
lu 1.000  - - 1.000  0.000 
lv  0.863 0.962 0.099 0.967 0.104 
mt  0.759  0.673 -0.086  0.700 -0.059 
nl 1.000  - - 0.999  -0.001 
pl  0.864  0.763 -0.101  0.804 -0.060 
pt  0.980  0.856 -0.124  0.867 -0.113 
se 1.000  - - 1.000  0.000 
si  0.958  0.947 -0.011  0.951 -0.007 55
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Table 20 Change in the composite indicator with 2000 and 2006 weights (continued)
Country CI 2000 (beneﬁ  t 
of the Doubt)
(A)












sk  0.945  0.883 -0.062  0.910 -0.034 
uk  0.944 0.948 0.004 0.962 0.018 
Notes: Column (A) reports the beneﬁ  t of the doubt benchmark composite indicator for 2000, as reported in Table 3. Column (B) shows 
a composite indicator for 2006 computed using the beneﬁ  t of the doubt weights determined for 2000, as they are reported in Table 3. 
Column (B-A) reports the difference between the composite indicators in columns (B) and (A). Column (D) displays the beneﬁ  t of the 
doubt benchmark composite indicator for 2006, as reported in Table 2. Column (D-A) reports the difference between the composite 
indicators in columns (D) and (A).56
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